Faced with an aggressive Russia, a war of attrition in Ukraine and uncertainty about U.S. reliability, anxious European allies are accelerating their defense spending. This year they are to collectively meet NATO’s target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense. And they have logged nine consecutive years of growth in their defense budgets.

Spending more, however, doesn’t necessarily mean spending well. NATO’s 2% goal is important as a baseline input metric, but it is unlikely to be enough to ensure that Europe strengthens its defenses before Russia reconstitutes its depleted forces. To assure that defense resources are spent well, some clear output metrics are needed to define what Europe’s military capabilities should be.

As the alliance continues its most urgent task — helping Ukraine win — it must address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing trans-Atlantic defense. Doing so will mean squaring a triangle: ensuring Europe’s capacity to better defend itself against Russia and manage crises along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region.

We have called squaring this triangle “achieving European strategic responsibility.”

In the past, Europe has sought “autonomy” without providing adequate defense resources, while the United States has wanted greater European defense contributions without diminishing U.S. influence. These tensions have been exacerbated by inadequate cooperation between U.S. and European defense industries.

NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington this summer provides an opportunity to reconcile these two perspectives and find a new strategic balance. To do so, European allies should focus on achieving two military capability or output goals as quickly as possible.

First, Europe should build its conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide at least half of all the forces and capabilities — including the strategic enablers such as strategic lift, air-to-air refueling and operational intelligence — required to deter and, if needed, to defeat a major-power aggressor.

Should a conflict simultaneously break out with China in Asia and with Russia in Europe, the United States may not be able to deploy adequate reinforcements to Europe. European allies need to be able to pick up the slack.

Second, European allies should develop capabilities to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s neighborhood without today’s heavy reliance on U.S. enablers. The European Union’s goal to develop the capacity to generate an “intervention force” of 5,000 individuals who could deploy beyond EU boundaries is a small yet useful start. Much more is needed.

Meeting these two output goals would allow Europe to become the first responder to most crises in its neighborhood, acting through NATO, through the EU or through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. It would permit the United States to shift some of its forces and strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region without significant reduction in the capabilities needed to deter Russia.

To achieve these two output goals, NATO allies could agree at the summit to use NATO’s Defense Planning Process to create a minimum level of military ambition necessary to attain European strategic responsibility. European allies and Canada should firmly commit to investing sufficient resources to ensure that within a few years they can meet 50% of all of NATO’s minimum capability requirements. Similar informal goals already exist; now they should be formalized and implemented at the summit.

Doing half of what’s needed within the alliance is an absolute minimal requirement for Europe to attain strategic responsibility. It assumes the Europeans can still count on the Americans. But if former President Donald Trump wins the November election and reneges on America’s NATO commitments, doing half will not be nearly enough. So Europe should not delay a moment longer. A delay could be fatal, as Russia is on a war footing, has attained significant combat experience and will reconstitute its drained forces as quickly as possible.

Achieving strategic responsibility for Europe will require more — not less — trans-Atlantic consultations. New mechanisms for NATO-EU coordination and industrial cooperation will be needed. Now is the moment for the U.S. and Europe to shed their contending views and to make European strategic responsibility a win-win for both sides of the Atlantic.

Hans Binnendijk, formerly a senior director for defense policy on the U.S. National Security Council, is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank. Daniel S. Hamilton, formerly a U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution think tank. Alexander R. Vershbow, formerly a NATO deputy secretary general, is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council.

There is, however, a way Washington could help hold Ukraine over until Congress gets its act together. While the administration has declared it’s “out of money” for Ukraine aid, it retains the authority to give Kyiv over $4 billion worth of materiel from U.S. stocks. The administration has declined to tap this authority because it’s out of funding to replace the donated equipment. But there are key weapons America could send now without compromising U.S. military readiness.

Ukraine is suffering from a shortage of men and materiel, particularly artillery ammunition. Congress’ monthslong delay in passing supplemental aid funding has exacerbated this challenge. Yet after rejecting an aid bill passed by the Senate earlier this month, House Speaker Mike Johnson appears to be in no rush to tackle the issue. It could be months before a bill reaches the president’s desk. Ukraine can’t afford to wait that long.

Comparing Russian, Ukrainian forces two years into war

Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Washington has relied on presidential drawdown authority, or PDA, as its primary vehicle for Ukraine aid. PDA allows the administration to give foreign partners weapons taken from existing U.S. stocks, expediting delivery. Through PDA, the United States has provided Kyiv with regular shipments of artillery ammunition, air defense interceptors and other critical capabilities.

Normally, the Pentagon replaces equipment donated under PDA by procuring new systems or munitions, which the military receives within months or at most a year or two. In 2022 and 2023, Congress provided both additional PDA for Ukraine as well as funding to replace the donated equipment.

However, the PDA packages for Ukraine ground to a halt in late December. The issue isn’t a lack of PDA itself; the administration can still donate around $4.2 billion worth of weapons. Rather, as the Office of Management and Budget’s director explained, the administration made a “very tough decision” to forgo the remaining PDA because the Pentagon has run out of money to buy replacement equipment.

The Defense Department presumably worries, despite its $850 billion-plus annual budgets, that continued donations within this $4 billion limit could jeopardize U.S. military readiness, absent assured replacement funding.

The administration is obviously right to prioritize American warfighters. But the U.S. military’s vast inventories contain plenty of things that wouldn’t be missed by American troops but would be a godsend to Ukraine. The Pentagon could afford to wait to replace these items — if it bothers to replace them at all.

Most notably, the United States could probably spare some more cluster munitions for Ukraine’s Western-made artillery systems. Known as dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, or DPICM, these rounds release dozens of smaller sub-munitions, increasing lethality. The Biden administration first provided 155mm DPICM rounds to Ukraine last summer as Western stocks of standard shells ran low. Ukrainian forces have since employed these munitions to great effect.

While it’s unclear how many DPICM rounds Kyiv has already received, the United States probably has a lot left. America’s DPICM inventory reportedly totaled nearly 3 million rounds as of spring 2023. Some of those munitions may be expired or otherwise unsuitable for Ukraine, but a considerable portion is probably still available.

It’s doubtful sending Ukraine more now would harm U.S. readiness. Pentagon policy discourages U.S. commanders from using DPICMs, particularly those with a dud rate greater than 1%, which are supposed to be retired from service.

In addition to shells, Ukraine needs more protected mobility. Even outdated vehicles like the humble M113 armored personnel carrier could offer significant value if provided in sufficient quantities. M113s play a key role in evacuating wounded Ukrainian soldiers and moving forces around the battlefield, but Kyiv needs more of these vehicles. Absent enough armored vehicles, Ukrainian troops must rely on civilian alternatives that provide little protection against Russian artillery and other threats.

The U.S. Army has thousands of M113s in long-term storage and is actively replacing those still in service. Sending a significant number of them to Ukraine would prevent avoidable casualties. That’s especially important at a time when Kyiv needs to husband its scarce manpower.

To be clear, this stopgap solution would not obviate the need for Congress to pass additional security assistance funding. It would merely buy time. U.S. assistance for Ukraine will not be sustainable without that funding, and there’s a limit to what America should provide without assured replacements.

Administration officials may chafe at having to explain how they’re able to resume aid despite being “out of money.” They may also fear weakening — if only slightly — the pressure on House Republicans to pass the supplemental. But those are poor reasons not to take a simple step that would save Ukrainian lives.

Ukrainian troops are fighting not only for their freedom but also vital U.S. interests. America cannot afford to leave them out to dry indefinitely.

John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, where retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow.

Four months into an unprecedented and brutal assault on the Gaza Strip following the Oct. 7 massacre carried out by Hamas, Israeli operations have already killed 28,000 Palestinians and brought untold suffering and a humanitarian crisis. About 1.2 million Palestinians have been forced to take refuge in Rafah, where they are bracing for what might come next.

Israel’s planned operation risks becoming the latest in a series of actions that have caused immense harm to civilians. Yet again, the impending attack raises grave concerns about U.S. support for Israel, particularly the arms transfers the Biden administration continues to provide. President Joe Biden’s response — the direct result of pressure from Senate Democrats — is National Security Memorandum-20. NSM-20 is a new policy directive that could create opportunities for the administration and Congress to ensure U.S.-funded arms are not used in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Although NSM-20 does not single out Israel, it is clearly in response to its war in Gaza. The memorandum was issued as part of a collaboration between the White House and Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md. The senator has consistently raised concerns about Israel’s conduct over the past four months and sought to include an amendment to Biden’s requested emergency supplemental, which would provide Israel $14 billion in unconditioned security assistance and has now passed the Senate.

Biden’s new memorandum, which draws from Van Hollen’s amendment, revolves around a requirement that all countries receiving U.S. security assistance provide “credible and reliable written assurances” regarding their compliance with international law. Countries engaged in armed conflict must do so within 45 days.

The memorandum further requires recipients to certify they will comply with Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act, a binding provision of law banning security assistance to any country where the foreign government “prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.”

U.S. law already conditions security assistance on compliance with international and human rights law, and recipients of U.S. arms risk a cut-off of transfers if they violate such laws. There is no evidence to suggest 620I has ever been enforced in its 28-year history. No Israeli unit has ever been barred from receiving U.S. assistance under the Leahy laws, which prohibit assistance to any unit where there is credible information the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.

Administrations have created mechanisms, such as the Conventional Arms Transfer policies, that make promising commitments on paper but too often result in little actual change in policy — especially for close U.S. allies and partners.

Under NSM-20, all recipients of U.S. taxpayer-funded assistance are now required to commit to using U.S. aid in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. In that way, this new memorandum could — and hopefully will — help operationalize important existing law and policy and lead to new points of leverage over Israeli operations.

But absent real political will, it risks being just another policy workaround that allows the Biden administration to claim, as it did to Defense News, despite publicly available evidence: “We have not seen any violations of the standards so have no plans to restrict assistance at this time.” Human rights organizations and media outlets have published ample evidence of Israel’s possible violations of international law, including with weapons from the United States.

Importantly, the memorandum creates a robust congressional reporting regime. The executive branch rarely volunteers to require reporting to Congress. The memorandum’s 90-day timeline for reporting to Congress on partners’ compliance with international law and facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery could draw congressional attention to civilian harm and humanitarian needs and create opportunities for legislators to conduct oversight or restrict assistance as appropriate.

But civilians in Gaza face an impending famine, and Israeli bombardment has decimated their medical system, housing, sanitation, and other civilian infrastructure. The memorandum’s timeline will not provide the immediate change of course necessary today.

Ultimately, the impact of NSM-20 will depend entirely on its implementation, and especially whether Congress pressures the Biden administration to hold the Israeli government accountable for the devastation caused by its operations in Gaza. An administration denial that Israel has violated any of the standards referenced in NSM-20 does not bode well for the seriousness with which the administration will implement its new memorandum and puts the onus on Congress to ensure those standards are upheld.

Seth Binder is director of advocacy at the Middle East Democracy Center, where he focuses on U.S. policy, security assistance, and arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. John Ramming Chappell is advocacy & legal fellow in the Center for Civilians in Conflict’s U.S. Program. His work focuses on U.S. law and policy related to civilian harm, arms sales and security assistance.

The latest National Security Scorecard from data analytics firm Govini revealed countless China-based firms remain deeply embedded in Defense Department supply chains across 12 critical technologies. Consider as well as that the draft version of the Pentagon’s National Defense Industrial Strategy noted that “today’s [defense-industrial base] would be challenged to provide the required capabilities at the speed and scale necessary for the U.S. military and our allies and partners to engage and prevail in a major conflict.”

This is what happens when just-in-time defense manufacturing meets dependence on Chinese companies, not to mention firms in Taiwan that Beijing could blockade during a crisis on which many, if not all, precision weapons and modern platforms depend.

The recently passed fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act barely affects the timeline for eliminating the Pentagon’s dependence on selected Chinese companies and materials. The narrow scope and lengthy time frames of current government efforts to alleviate our supply chain dependencies send an unspoken message to Beijing: The DoD does not have, nor will it soon have, the supply base required to prosecute a long war against China. The message to Taiwan is that we can’t build the weapons and platforms needed to defend you in a protracted war without access to these at-risk supply chains.

Thankfully, there are solutions that the Pentagon and the administration can take to armor the Achilles’ heel of our defense supply chains.

First, they can focus on resiliency rather than independence, entailing the pursuit of multiple solutions to ensure the DoD has sufficient stocks — or access to the production — of the products, materials and services required for a long conflict. To build resiliency, the Pentagon can focus on increasing the size of its inventories, cultivating new second and near-shore sources, and redesigning munitions and platforms that are especially critical for an Indo-Pacific fight.

Resiliency requires assessing the true extent of China- and Taiwan-based dependencies, and remediating them.

Second, the Pentagon should ask Congress to invert its approach to how it defines, analyzes and addresses Pentagon supply chain vulnerabilities. To date, the government’s efforts have largely focused on inputs, as well as suppliers based in so-called covered countries like China. But if the government inverts its approach from inputs (e.g., rare earths) to outputs (e.g., an F-35 jet), it will address dependencies in a more holistic manner, forcing a review of the full supply chain.

Requiring the defense-industrial base to quickly conduct a bottom-up analysis by critical munition and platform that identifies each node in its supply chains — something it could readily by law do with commercial software — would establish a baseline for modeling different platform and munition inputs under different scenarios. These models would rapidly identify potential and growing risks as well as assist the DoD in proactively addressing them. They would also help avert a scenario where the DoD has to reactively scramble to address the collapse of a critical node far down in its supply chains.

Lastly, like the U.S. had during World War II with the War Production Board, someone or some organization should be in charge of these efforts. The Federal Acquisition Security Council may be the best organization to fill that role, as it would be well placed to roll up our supply chain dependencies, place them against requirements to create demand signals and determine how best to fill them.

These actions could be included by the Pentagon in its budget for the coming fiscal year — or given their urgency, a single, focused bill, an executive order, or a future emergency supplemental.

No one knows if or when tensions with China could spiral into armed conflict. But there’s no doubt that the world is becoming more dangerous. The U.S. must send a message to Beijing that we are prepared to prosecute a long war if needed. And the U.S. must also send a message to Taiwan that it will be able to support the island in a time of need. Without ending China’s chokehold on our defense supply chains, we will be hard-pressed to send either.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John G. Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the service. Mark Rosenblatt runs Rationalwave Capital Partners, which invests in public and private technology companies.

Secretary Kendall was exactly right, and that is why the organizational reforms are so important. However, their ultimate success comes with a big proviso. The Department of Defense and Congress must also address chronic underfunding and force structure shortfalls that are degrading the Air Force and Space Force’s ability to keep pace with China and deter great power aggression. No organizational plan, no matter how competent its design, can make up for these shortfalls without additional resources.

For too long, the Department of the Air Force has been chronically underfunded to meet its global missions. Between 2002 and 2021, the Army and the Navy received $1.3 trillion and $914 billion more, respectively, than the Department of the Air Force. This is consequential money — even by Washington, D.C., standards.

Consider that $1 trillion is double what it will take to procure and operate the Air Force’s two nuclear triad legs in their entirety — the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system and the B-21 bomber. Much of this discrepancy is hidden by the reality that at least $40 billion of the Department of the Air Force’s fiscal 2023 budget is pass-through funding — money included in its top line but not controlled by its leadership. With great power competition now a reality, air power and space power are in tremendous demand, and it is time to adjust the defense budget to this reality.

The nation surged funding to the Army for the ground-centric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now it is time for concerted investment to meet the growing global demand for air power and space power.

Anyone questioning the imperative for budget rebalancing needs to only consider that Air Force and Space Force capabilities are fundamentally too small and often too old given real-world mission demands.

While some may grow sentimental looking at aircraft like the B-52 bomber, B-1 bomber, KC-135 aerial refueling tanker, E-3 airborne warning and control system, T-38 jet trainer, F-15 fighter, F-16 fighter, A-10 combat aircraft, and even the UH-1 helicopter, the reality is that asking airmen to strap into decades-old planes — often exceeding half a century — crosses ethical lines. Not only are these aircraft nearing structural and mechanical exhaustion, but they are also increasingly unable to execute their missions in today’s stressing threat environments.

Newer aircraft like C-17 airlifters reached their initial operating capability before many of the crews now flying them were born. And other front-line combat aircraft, like the F-22 fighter, were not procured in sufficient volume. Gaps created by these shortfalls will not soon be resolved by aircraft now in production. The F-35 fighter and B-21 are not programmed for a high enough acquisition-ramp rate to reset their respective inventories fast enough to keep pace with China, much less pose a credible deterrent this decade.

On orbit, the Space Force is surging to reset almost all aspects of its architecture — an imperative given clear intent from adversaries to contest the space domain. That is why the Space Development Agency’s efforts are so crucial. Past that, many U.S. space systems are simply old. Consider the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program — the backbone of all DoD space-based weather capabilities. The system is far past its design life, and should a key asset fail, there is no backup plan. Replacements in the form of the Electro-Optical/Infrared Weather System and the Weather System Follow-on—Microwave program have been delayed far too long, largely due to budget shortfalls.

Resetting the force for great power competition also requires enough trained professionals. Whether looking at operational units or at the headquarters level, there are too many shortfalls in far too many career fields. Consider the Air Force’s perennial 2.000-pilot gap for fighter aircraft, a dearth of experienced maintainers and the service’s undersized electronic warfare community. Not only do these gaps hinder mission execution, but they also have profound impacts on the ability to teach and mentor new personnel, determine future weapon system requirements and execute program oversight.

The Space Force faces similar issues. The service was stood up based on end strength figures tied to legacy operating constructs, not the imperative to deter and defeat attacks in, from and through space. They also did not account for massive mission growth in the space domain, nor the need to provide space expertise throughout the U.S. combatant command enterprise. Ends must be aligned with the means.

Secretary Kendall and his Department of the Air Force leadership team have done their part reshaping the Air Force and Space Force. Now it is time to ensure their plan is adequately resourced. Whether the Air Force and Space Force ultimately succeed, as the nation requires, will come down to factors that are largely outside the Department of the Air Force’s control. Money, the scale and scope of modernization, and manpower are variables that demand immediate attention by the DoD and congressional leaders. It is crucial to heed Secretary Kendall’s warning: “We are out of time.” Internal reforms can only do so much; the Department of Defense and Congress must do their part.

Douglas A. Birkey is the executive director for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

Now that we have had time to evaluate the results of this watershed moment, it is imperative that America charts a new course toward a robust semiconductor strategy to safeguard our national security and our economy.

Today, China and Taiwan combined have nearly three quarters of the global market share of semiconductors, which poses a threat to the U.S. economy and its critical military products and systems. Recent international developments have cast a stark spotlight on the decided deficiencies of the current global, voluntary export control framework known as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Russia’s brazen invasion of Ukraine and China’s multifaceted gray zone war against Taiwan have laid bare the shortcomings of this voluntary association.

In this era of relentless global geopolitics and intense technological competition, we find ourselves at a pivotal juncture where the bedrock of our future security lies in a semiconductor treaty firmly rooted in the Wassenaar Arrangement but fortified with substantial revisions, all with a keen focus on the indispensable semiconductor industry.

The Wassenaar Arrangement, conceived as a voluntary global export control alliance, was designed to facilitate information exchange among member nations regarding technologies, including semiconductors, that have military or military-civilian applications. The goal, as articulated by the Arms Control Association, is to promote “greater responsibility” in military exports and prevent “destabilizing accumulations” of weapons. This arrangement was never intended to target specific regions or groups of states, and members lacked veto authority over each other’s exports, rendering it a voluntary association.

The United States, alongside 41 other nations, stands as a member, while Russia, also a member, has repeatedly exposed the inadequacies of this voluntary accord. The absence of a robust global semiconductor export control regime leaves the United States vulnerable in the technological race, especially as China, conspicuously absent from the Wassenaar Arrangement, seeks to surge ahead.

The time has come for the United States to lead the charge in crafting an international treaty governing the export of advanced semiconductors, involving key allies that constitute the backbone of the semiconductor supply chain: Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea and Taiwan. This coalition can fittingly be christened the “Semi Allies Group.”

We must elevate the Wassenaar Arrangement to the status of a binding Wassenaar Treaty, targeting nations such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, which pose military and economic threats to the founding members. Our primary focus should be on semiconductor technology, a linchpin of both our economic prosperity and national defense. This treaty framework would grant each member veto authority over another member’s proposed exports.

Converting parts of the Wassenaar Arrangement into a specialized treaty would address its glaring inadequacies by concentrating on the key semiconductor supply chain leaders, honing in on a single critical technology, targeting a specific group of destabilizing nations and providing all participating members with the much-needed veto authority.

The existing U.S. tactics of unilaterally imposing ever-stricter unilateral export controls on domestic companies selling to China, combined with efforts to persuade other key nations to follow suit, is far from ideal for American military defense and its semiconductor businesses. They cannot rely on the United States indefinitely convincing foreign competitors — particularly in export-driven economies like Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan — to refrain from selling advanced semiconductor technology to China. The U.S. military should support this multilateral treaty approach because it keeps the most advanced technology out of the hands of our fiercest foes.

Likewise, U.S. semiconductor businesses should also rally behind this approach, recognizing that if they are barred from exporting a specific semiconductor technology to China, their primary commercial rivals will face similar restrictions.

The geopolitical landscape has undergone profound changes, with NATO uniting against Russia’s Ukraine invasion and the Quad — comprising the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia — aligning to counter China’s expansionist ambitions. These developments present golden opportunities for multinational cooperation in matters of defense.

The establishment of a Wassenaar Treaty will not be without challenges, such as securing a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate. Nevertheless, it is a challenge worth pursuing. Bipartisan support for the CHIPS and Science Act as well as shared concerns about China’s threat to Taiwan suggest the political will may exist at this critical juncture in time.

The US needs a holistic semiconductor strategy

Effective export controls on semiconductors within the Semi Allies Group, under the proposed Wassenaar Treaty, could pave the way for the inclusion of other critical aspects of the global semiconductor trade. The Biden administration’s efforts to coordinate subsidies supporting specific members of the Semi Allies Group’s industrial policies align with the goal of promoting domestic semiconductor manufacturing, thus averting production surpluses or redundant government investments. This subsidy coordination could also become an additional focus under the treaty.

Furthermore, the Biden administration’s recent executive order issued on Aug. 9, 2023 — instructing the Treasury Department to develop regulations prohibiting American investment in certain advanced technologies, including semiconductors, in China for military purposes — underscores the necessity of multilateral, coordinated restrictions on outbound investments in China among the Semi Allies Group. This ensures that U.S. private equity and venture capital are not unfairly disadvantaged while their counterparts in other member countries remain free to invest. This, too, could become another facet for the Semi Allies Group to coordinate under the treaty.

The time has come for the United States to take resolute action in safeguarding its national security interests. The vulnerabilities of the Wassenaar Arrangement have been laid bare by recent events. We have witnessed the consequences of timid responses to Russia’s invasions of Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. We cannot afford to be complacent. By establishing a Wassenaar Treaty with a laser focus on semiconductors, we can address the glaring gap in our export control framework for this critical technology. The moment has arrived to secure our technological edge and protect our nation’s future. The time for action is now.

André Brunel is an international technology attorney with Reiter, Brunel and Dunn. This commentary was adapted from his article published in the Journal of Business & Technology Law. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are his and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the law firm or any clients it represents.

Nearly two decades after then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen championed a 1,000-ship Navy, the rationale for a combined fleet — that is, a maritime fighting force augmented by international allies and partners — is more relevant than ever.

Recent events demonstrate that keeping vital waterways free and open requires both political resolve and — in the words of the current CNO, Adm. Lisa Franchetti — ”players on the field.” But oceans are vast, ships cannot be in two places at once, and building them quickly is difficult and costly.

Luckily, the U.S. is the central node in a network of democratically minded, technologically advanced partners that confer a strategic advantage. Moreover, many of these allies operate similar platforms and systems in their respective navies — gas turbine engines, the Aegis shipboard combat system, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, H-60 helicopters, and F-35 fighter jets — that can yield efficiencies in force design, generation and employment.

However, leaping from interoperability to interchangeability is, in part, a human endeavor. To that end, the U.S. Navy has exchange agreements to host foreign professionals and send U.S. personnel abroad. Refocusing these programs through the lens of potential military conflict can accelerate the benefits of collaboration.

First, expand the number of enlisted personnel exchanges to build a deeper reservoir of expertise across the allied force. Within today’s U.S. Navy, approximately 80 of nearly 300 foreign personnel exchanges are at the enlisted level — a number that should rise as the AUKUS pathway is implemented. These exchanges should be increased and modified to include a tour aboard a ship or with an aircraft squadron common to both navies, followed by an assignment at a regional maintenance facility, fleet logistics center or schoolhouse. Such an approach would develop common knowledge and capitalize on diversity of experience to generate better business practices and warfighting advantages for both sides. Leveraging some common ratings may even ease the strain on U.S. personnel by filling important, but gapped, seagoing billets.

What’s next for the US-Philippines basing agreement?

Second, improve allied officers’ exposure to U.S. Navy operations and decision-making. Currently, foreign officers — including those with whom I served aboard all three of my destroyers — embed within an operational unit for a multiyear tour, and then return home. Consequently, their experience can vary based on their unit’s prescribed mission and seagoing time.

One option is to shorten the duration, widen the aperture and increase throughput to maximize the program’s return on investment. For example, a condensed assignment aboard a mission-ready ship, with an immediate successive rotation on a carrier strike group or numbered fleet commander staff, would expose exchange officers to challenges and problem-solving at different levels of command.

Conversely, it may make sense to lengthen some exchanges on common platforms (such as guided-missile destroyers) to achieve near-perfect tactical synergy — just like “Project Seedcorn,” in which British maritime patrol pilots integrated into allied squadrons for up to eight years to maintain their flying proficiency while the U.K. transitioned airframes from the Nimrod to the now-ubiquitous P-8A Poseidon.

Third, pair student learning exchanges with fleet experience to develop a more comprehensive picture of the American way of war. The Naval Academy runs myriad international undergraduate programs, ranging from reciprocal semesters abroad to four-year immersion, but foreign graduates return to their home country after earning their diploma.

Instead, Congress should amend public law to make these graduates eligible to attend fleet-accession training alongside their classmates, and then serve a shortened tour in the U.S. Navy so they return home as seasoned junior officers.

Similarly, assigning foreign graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College or even the Surface Warfare Schools Command — which teaches four ship-handling and tactical courses to international naval officers — to fleet staffs would better expose them to U.S. naval planning and operations, albeit on a larger scale than in their home navies.

The U.S. Navy has active agreements to host foreign personnel from 20 countries, 18 of which are parties to collective defense arrangements. However, at the Naval Academy, only 19 of the 57 midshipmen currently in the service academy’s four-year foreign student program hail from allied countries.

Though some highly capable allies operate their own national military academies, encouraging and favoring applicants from this partnership pool — authority Congress has granted to service secretaries — would generate maximum combined warfighting utility.

Lastly, reassess how the Department of the Navy is organized in order to optimize the foreign exchange program’s effectiveness. Responsibilities for international engagement policy, personnel placement, hardware sales and information access are currently divided across the fleet, Navy staff and secretariat offices. Mirroring the Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs office, which consolidates many of these programmatic functions under one managerial umbrella, could better centralize execution of diplomatic exchanges and align resources with operational needs.

To be sure, interpersonal challenges remain to achieving interchangeability. One is military rules of engagement, which can complicate real-world combined operations when they differ by country. Another is information sharing, where restrictions can delay personnel placements, induce frustrations and undermine program goals.

Fortunately, thanks to AUKUS, Congress is melting the bureaucratic permafrost that can freeze international coordination. For instance, the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act includes a mandate to “reform and improve the policies, processes, and procedures,” “increase efficiency and reduce timelines,” review foreign disclosure policies, and reduce the use of Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals handling caveat.

These solutions can be applied more broadly to provide access, preserve safeguards, and enhance high-end combined tactical training opportunities in our warfighting development centers, schoolhouses and afloat commands.

Expanding soft power personnel exchanges can build common knowledge and complement the hard power platform choices many American allies have deliberately made to enable closer cooperation. Such investments — like Project Seedcorn — may grow into a sea of a thousand ships.

Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.

This is the fourth commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is here, the second here and the third here.

By leveraging their resources, technologies and production capacity, the U.S. and its allies can help Ukraine meet this challenge.

In addition to artillery shells, one of Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield needs is an enormous number of one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as “kamikaze drones.” First and foremost, this means first-person view — or “FPV” — drones, combining cheap commercially available quadcopters rigged with munitions. Both Russia and Ukraine widely employ FPVs as improvised loitering munitions used to attack vehicles and personnel at or near the front line. But while the Ukrainians adopted FPV drones first, Russia now has the edge thanks to its advantage in production capacity.

With Western-provided shells currently in short supply, Ukraine will need to lean even more heavily on FPVs as a partial replacement for artillery. The Ukrainians are making many thousands of FPV drones every month, but they’re still well short of Kyiv’s goal of 1 million per year. Although Ukraine has received some loitering munitions from the United States and other Western countries, they’re far more expensive and aren’t produced at anywhere near the sufficient scale.

Ukraine also needs more long-range attack drones designed to strike targets far behind the frontlines. Here, too, Moscow currently has an advantage thanks to its Iranian-provided Shahed UAVs, which Russia began producing itself last year. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia can now make as many as 350 Shaheds per month.

Although U.S. companies don’t yet mass-produce anything like the Shahed, Ukrainian industry has begun making a variety of long-range attack drones and continues to develop new designs. Kyiv’s forces have repeatedly employed such UAVs to strike airbases and other deep targets both in occupied territory and inside Russia.

If Ukraine can sufficiently scale production, it could beat Russia at its own game. In 2024, Kyiv aims to make 11,000 one-way attack UAVs with a range of at least 300 kilometers. These drones can supplement Ukraine’s limited stocks of Western-supplied missiles.

Ukraine has an innovative and rapidly developing UAV industry, but a lack of resources is slowing progress. Western assistance can help Ukraine scale production and obtain access to advanced technologies and components. Europe intends to do its part. Latvia is leading a UAV coalition for Ukraine, while Lithuania has expressed interest in helping Ukraine produce drones. But the United States has an important role to play, too.

So, what’s to be done?

First, the Biden administration and Congress should incentivize U.S. defense companies to partner with Ukrainian firms. One option is the transfer of Ukrainian intellectual property to American companies for production at scale in the United States. U.S. firms could also invest in localization of production in Ukraine. This sort of cooperation is already beginning to happen, but U.S. government support could help it blossom.

In concert, the United States and Ukraine should consider establishing a working group that brings together government, military, and industry officials focused on unmanned systems. This forum would help institutionalize key relationships and promote defense-industrial cooperation. It would also benefit the U.S. military and American companies by helping them absorb lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Kyiv, for its part, is eager to engage in such a forum.

In the meantime, Congress should consider permitting Kyiv to spend a portion of its U.S. security assistance funding inside Ukraine to procure UAVs that American industry currently struggles to supply in sufficient quantities. This approach, after all, would not be some dramatic departure from current U.S. practice with other democratic partners.

Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, provides partner nations with grants or loans with which to procure U.S. defense articles, services, or training. Washington pledged over $1.6 billion in FMF for Ukraine during the 2022 and 2023 fiscal years. In its supplemental request for fiscal year 2024, the Biden administration asked Congress for $7.2 billion in FMF funding, including $1.7 billion for Kyiv and other European countries affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The rest would go to Israel and Indo-Pacific countries, including Taiwan.

Unlike Israel and Taiwan, however, Congress has not authorized Ukraine to use FMF funding for “offshore procurement.” Kyiv must spend all its FMF money in the United States, whereas Jerusalem and Taipei can use some of their U.S.-provided funds for purchases from their own defense industries.

As a general rule, there are good reasons for requiring partners to spend FMF money in the United States. Foreign demand for American-made weapons spurs the U.S. economy, employs Americans, builds valuable defense-industrial capacity, and strengthens political support for arming key partners to deter and defeat common adversaries.

Sometimes, however, U.S. interests are best served by making an exception to the rule. Ukraine’s urgent need for large quantities of cheap drones is just such instance. If and when Congress finally passes the supplemental, it should take that opportunity to revisit this issue.

With this additional funding, Kyiv not only could buy more UAVs but could also swap out Chinese-made drones and components for Ukrainian-made alternatives. In addition, Ukraine could scale up its integration of more expensive features, such as thermal imaging cameras, jamming resistance, home-on-jam capability, and machine vision. This would give Kyiv a boost in the ever-evolving race between Russian and Ukrainian drone technology and provide an offset for Russia’s superiority in electronic warfare and proliferation of small counter-drone jammers.

Vladimir Putin wants to weaken and control Ukraine. If he succeeds, Europeans and Americans will regret it for years to come. Washington and its allies can avoid that outcome by providing Kyiv with additional security assistance, which should include ensuring Ukrainian forces have the drones they need to fight Putin’s unprovoked invasion.

John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Bradley Bowman serves as senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power.

The war in Ukraine has provided desperately needed momentum to renew the European defense industry. Efforts to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces with weaponry have exposed startling gaps in Europe’s readiness for large-scale conflict. European nations have been found lacking not only adequate munition stockpiles, but also the industrial base required to refill inventories to keep up with Ukraine’s continued pleas for weapons. At the same time, the United States’ own production challenges and competing regional priorities suggest European NATO members cannot count on Washington to save the day.

NATO has a munitions problem, and the European defense industry needs to step up. Now is the time to think big.

While much of the conversation about European munitions center on the manufacture and supply of 155mm artillery shells, a narrow focus on artillery shells fails to capture the full scope of improvements needed in Europe’s munitions capacity for NATO to maintain a credible deterrence. For some European NATO members, artillery shells are just the tip of the munitions inventory and weapons industry iceberg.

There are at least three competing munitions demands on the European defense industry that require immediate attention. First, European states, NATO and the European Union must continue to supply weapons to Ukraine. The sources of these munitions include continued pulling from (dwindling) stockpiles, the transfer of previously existing orders to Ukraine, and new orders of munitions whose production has scaled up relatively quickly, such as 155mm shells.

Second, European NATO members must refill their own inventories of weapons depleted by transfers to Ukraine, including artillery shells, anti-tank missiles, longer-range rockets and surface-to-air missiles. Some of these weapons dated from the Cold War and were nearing obsolescence; others were more current. In either case, nations must purchase modern versions of these weapons or pursue other capabilities that accomplish the same missions.

This is an urgent requirement: NATO cannot plan on Russia being too weak or distracted to be a threat. If Europe’s industrial base cannot meet these demands quickly enough to ensure NATO’s near-term readiness requirements, members should consider foreign suppliers or purchases of alternate capabilities, like novel loitering munitions or air defense solutions.

Third, European NATO members must build up larger stocks of modern and future weapons to meet revised defense requirements through the end of the decade. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has exposed the inadequacy of Europe’s previous war reserves: It is not enough to refill stocks — they need to be expanded.

Sustained munitions requirements for protracted conflict are likely much higher than previously assessed, as NATO’s secretary general admitted last year. To fill these requirements, European nations must build a modern arsenal sized for a protracted conflict in the next decade. This begins with precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles and other long-range strike capabilities. Group purchases of weapons, such as the NATO-supported purchase of Patriot missiles, would increase European buying power and potentially reduce unit costs.

While purchasing currently fielded weapons, NATO members must also simultaneously develop the next generation of munitions and pursue advanced technologies such as hypersonic, autonomous and low-cost weapons. The production timelines of existing weapons and the development timelines of future weapons require Europe to invest now to attain sufficient stockpiles by the end of the decade. Given uncertainties about future threats, these development programs should focus on versatile and modular weapons that afford military planners increased flexibility across a wide range of scenarios.

Moreover, in addition to performance requirements, NATO militaries should prioritize European manufacturability and true interoperability as design criteria for future munitions programs.

Finally, in pursuing these three priorities now, Europe must foster a munitions-industrial base capable of competing with a mobilized Russian industrial base. Commentators often point to Europe’s gross domestic product being nearly eight times that of Russia, but GDP alone does not produce weapons. Working alongside the European Union, NATO — given its convening power and its role in setting munitions requirements and standards for much of Europe — should lead conversations about how to support a European defense industry scaled not only to refill and increase stockpiles but also to provide high-tech weapons in the future.

Built into a strategic approach to the European munitions industry is the recognition that not all munitions are the same and Europe may need to pay for the maintenance of excess or “surge” capacity. The production capacity of some weapons — like artillery shells — can be increased more quickly and so can be more fungible, though do require regular investment from governments. Other production lines — like for cruise and interceptor missiles — are less flexible, so orders must be consistent over time to ensure that NATO has enough when it needs them.

Two years into the Ukraine war, European defense officials are coming around to the reality of these varied demands. This is a positive sign, but European NATO members must move quickly to make good on pledges to increase defense spending and provide a sustained demand signal for critical munitions. Russia is well ahead of Europe in expanding its munitions production capacity. It is time for European NATO members to acknowledge the true scale of their weapon requirements and adopt a strategic approach to meeting them in the near and long term.

Katherine Kjellström Elgin is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank where she focuses on U.S. and European defense strategies. She is the author of the forthcoming CSBA report “More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military and its Ability to Change.” Tyler Hacker is a research fellow at CSBA, where he focuses on great power conflict. He is the author of “Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conflict.”

If our adversaries understand we have the capability and capacity to produce enough weapons systems to enter a conflict and win, they will be less likely to want to engage and more likely to seek a diplomatic solution.

But as we’ve seen with supply chain issues caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and industrial base constraints that have limited the U.S. and allied ability to support Ukraine (and foreign military sales to Taiwan), the U.S. is not ready for a conflict with a peer adversary.

This is a national crisis that will take an all hands on deck effort to resolve. But it’s not clear the sense of urgency is strong enough. Are we truly ready?

The highly anticipated U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy was released this month by the Department of Defense’s Office of Industrial Base Policy. This document provides a comprehensive outline of the issues in the defense industrial base and details the myriad approaches that must be taken to resolve them.

But most of what is in the NDIS is not entirely new. This is not intended as a criticism — the DoD has been tracking and reporting on industrial base issues and the means to mitigate those issues for many years. It sends industrial capabilities reports to Congress annually and produced large reports in 2018 and 2022 on the strength of the defense industrial base.

However, the NDIS provides a singular place to find this information. And it seems to have attracted the attention of a much wider audience than previous reports. At this point, it appears most policymakers and intellectuals recognize it’s important to revitalize U.S. manufacturing and that the defense industrial base is a key part of national security.

The implementation plan for the NDIS is scheduled to be released at the end of March, but it is already obvious many hard decisions will need to be made to successfully implement this strategy. Most of the solutions will require multiple people, organizations, and resources working in tandem — and many of them are not within DoD’s control.

The IBP office has been attempting to address these issues and improve the resilience of the industrial base for years, but they cannot do it alone. And although other parts of DoD, and even other parts of the government and industry, have been talking about supply chain security and resilience as well, there has never been a concerted, sustained effort, where everyone considers this a top priority.

The DoD plays a very large role here of course, especially with regards to how it sets requirements, purchases systems, and makes investments in technologies and in the industrial base. Congress plays another large role by ensuring steady, on-time procurement funding, and funding to mitigate industrial base issues. Industry plays a role in developing and using innovative technology and flexible and agile manufacturing processes that improve efficiency and increase resiliency.

The interagency too plays a part by helping with trade remedies and foreign investment controls, workforce development and labor regulations, and enabling international collaboration. And our international partners must help co-develop and co-produce systems and provide capability the U.S. can leverage to mitigate industrial base and innovation gaps.

It remains to be seen if these at times competing forces can rally around this call to action and take the steps necessary to rescue our industrial base in time.

Christine Michienzi was chief technology officer in the Defense Department’s Industrial Base Policy shop and senior adviser to the undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment.

That fact only amplifies the criticality of the decisions needed to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, even more relevant now across the Taiwan Strait since China’s preferred outcome in the recent Taiwanese presidential election did not materialize. All indications point to continued turbulence and tension in the most pivotal region of the world.

Deterrence has been failing all too routinely. Central to deterrence is an adversary’s perception of both the intent and the capability to respond in a compelling way to aggression. In the case of the defense of Taiwan, President Biden has been consistent in his public statements of U.S. support in case of Chinese aggression.

Yet, there has been a certain level of inconsistency in the commitments that the U.S., particularly from certain parts of the departments of State and Defense, has made with regard to providing Taiwan with the defense articles it needs to enhance deterrence vis-à-vis China’s overwhelming forces.

The rhetorical focus on asymmetric means to deter the People’s Liberation Army is one such example. The U.S. has in recent years mandated Taiwan acquire only asymmetric weapons systems. While not completely unfounded, this almost absolutist U.S. emphasis on asymmetry may be counterproductive, as an asymmetric strategy can be enhanced by conventional systems.

The debate on what constitutes an asymmetric capability lingers and has impacted Taiwanese requests for systems, such as F-16 jets, M1A2 tanks, E-2D battle management aircraft, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, MH-60R helicopters, and the domestically produced indigenous defense submarine program, the Yushan amphibious assault ship, and a new class of frigates. Yet, an asymmetric strategy is not defined by the tactical weapons that create the effects necessary for strategic victory. An asymmetric strategy, through the effects its operational plans call for, is reflected in how the weapons in its inventory are deployed and employed.

Ukraine presents several illustrative examples in how it is implementing its strategy with weapons that are not traditionally considered asymmetrical. HIMARS is not an asymmetrical operational or tactical system in design or structure. Weighing in at 18 tons, carrying six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, it is supported by an MTVR MK37 vehicle to load and unload a single HIMARS six-strong GMLRS pod. The MK37 has a gross vehicle weight rating of 31 tons.

Despite these non-asymmetric attributes, HIMARS is creating asymmetric effects in the hands of the Ukrainians. “We are seeing real and measurable gains from Ukraine in the use of these systems. For example, the Ukrainians have struck over 400 targets with the HIMARS, and they’ve had devastating effect,” said Gen. Mark Milley, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What does this have to do with Taiwan? The U.S. position has been that it does not support Taiwan’s request for certain systems, as they are deemed not to be asymmetric platforms based on the definitions of select elements within the U.S. government. The Ukrainian HIMARS example underscores the point that strategies and operational concepts can be and, in Taiwan’s case, should be and are asymmetrical.

Moreover, in East Asia we can create an asymmetric symmetry by encouraging allies and partners to operate the same systems. There is commonality in combined operations and integrated strategies enabled by common tactical system employment. When extended to partners and allies, this has a multiplying effect.

There is truth in the dictum that states: “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” In fact, a senior U.S. Department of Defense official recently detailed the magnifying impact of P-8s — arguably not an asymmetric system — operating across the Indo-Pacific, with partners and allies as diverse as Australia, India, New Zealand and South Korea flying these aircraft along with the U.S. Navy. The same could be said about E-2Ds, F-16s and MQ-9 drones.

The scale and scope of Chinese military operations in the Western Pacific have grown exponentially. A day rarely passes where an allied aircraft or vessel is not harassed by the PLA in international airspace or waters. Even more common are the intrusions of Chinese military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zones.

China military ‘ready to fight’ after drills near Taiwan

While there are many urgent needs for Taiwan, one of the most critical is for it to acquire and operate a modern air battle-management solution. The daily competition in the air and sea above and around Taiwan is an asymmetric fight, given the quantitative and qualitative correlation of forces overwhelmingly favoring the PLA. Addressing this in the information domain from both operational and policy perspectives could flip the asymmetric script:

• Taiwan’s first line of defense, its fighter aircraft, needs a modernized replacement – an airborne early warning platform for command and control.
• A battle-management solution could provide a direct feed to a common operating picture. Any commonality in platforms between the U.S., Japan and Taiwan could enable synergies in early warning and targeting data.
• A solution set that includes an over-the-horizon capability that could operate east of Taiwan could provide standoff from mainland China’s deployed assets.

Setting the stage for potential interoperability with the U.S. and Japan in case geopolitical events dictate that necessity is critical. A powerful signal would be sent to Beijing if Taiwan operated the same type of platforms as the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. It would not be lost on PLA leadership that the potential existed for the three militaries to share a common operating picture. That in and of itself strengthens deterrence.

The U.S. could allow for the potential sharing of data between similar battle-management platforms without actually sharing data unless and until the government determines it is time to do so by maintaining the ability to control how, when and if platforms could interoperate. Having the option does not commit the U.S., but does allow for flexibility and a potential asymmetric coalition response.

The days of black-and-white definitions of asymmetry have passed. Let’s not continue to be hemmed in by them.

Adm. Scott H. Swift (ret.) served as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the 7th Fleet. Heino Klinck served as the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. He is also the founder and principal of the consultancy Klinck Global.

Since 1999, Russia has invested tremendous amounts of money in maintaining legacy systems as well as developing and fielding new types, totaling more than 30 types of nonstrategic nuclear weapon delivery systems, ranging from cruise and ballistic missiles, torpedoes, air-dropped bombs, and anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missiles. Clearly, Russia values nonstrategic nuclear weapons, or NSNW, particularly those that serve a dual duty — delivering conventional or nuclear warheads.

President Vladimir Putin has asserted that Russia’s nuclear weapons are a guarantor of its sovereignty and its status as a great power. The roles of NSNWs in Russian strategy include deterring unwanted conflicts, coercing adversaries, shaping the battlefield for planned conflicts, controlling escalation within conflicts to protect the Russian homeland, preventing outside powers (read: the U.S.) from intervening in its conflicts, and ensuring that it prevails in war.

NSNWs provide Russia with a comparative and asymmetric advantage over its immediate neighbors as well as the U.S. and its allies, especially considering that the NATO alliance relies entirely on U.S. air-dropped B61-12 bombs for theater nuclear strikes. Russia, on the other hand, employs and continues to develop NSNWs of varying types and ranges to provide a nuclear option at every rung in the escalation ladder.

Recent developments reinforce these observations about Russian thought and doctrine regarding NSNWs. In its war on Ukraine, Russia has used direct nuclear signaling to the U.S. and NATO with its strategic and theater nuclear forces. More recently, it has shown with Belarus that it sees NSNWs as a useful tool to exert further control over its near abroad and increase its coercive power against NATO. China is watching carefully and drawing lessons that it may apply in a potential war against Taiwan — a fact well known to the countries across that region.

A particularly concerning development, from the perspective of the West, is Russia’s belief in its ability to gain and maintain escalation dominance. Russia also has demonstrated during its war on Ukraine that it can absorb personnel and materiel losses in conventional combat to a degree unimaginable to the West, calling into question the very concept of unacceptable costs through mutually assured destruction. This tolerance for casualties and indifference to mutually assured destruction may also be shared by China, which demonstrated a similar indifference to casualties in the Korean War.

The more that can be understood of Russian doctrine and military thought related to NSNWs, the more likely it is that deterrence with Russia can be maintained. Understanding Russia and maintaining deterrence vis-à-vis Russia are matters of survival for the West. If Russia believes that it can control escalation in a potential conflict with the West, and can use nuclear weapons to force the U.S. to back down and concede defeat, it may one day seek to initiate conflict and defeat NATO.

While the performance of Russian conventional forces and depletion of its armies may stay its hand for a while, Russia surely will rearm with its enormous stores of oil and gas money built up over the past few years. Yet many in the West have not grappled with the realities of Russia’s NSNW arsenal, nor developed means to counter Russia’s likely stratagems, systems and doctrine.

I am not advocating for the West to mirror Russia’s nuclear posture by any means, but a deeper and broader study of Russia’s NSNW thought and doctrine is essential to maintaining the peace in Europe.

Within Russia itself, a wide-ranging debate continues in political and military journals on the best way to prevail in a conflict with the West, examining the role of China and other powers such as Iran and North Korea in a potential wider conflict. In the West, the debates on a “two-peer” problem — maintaining deterrence against Russia and China simultaneously — are only now getting underway.

With North Korea and Pakistan increasing their own stocks of NSNWs, and thinking about how they could be used in conflict, Western thought is following on behind the rest. Russian thinking on nuclear weapons, and NSNWs in particular, appears consistent with certain strands of Soviet thinking, but with significant discontinuities due to improvements in the accuracy and lethality of a variety of short-, medium- and long-range artillery and missiles.

Examining this scholarship systematically, through three eras — the Cold War, post-Cold War to Crimea, and Crimea to today — can provide critical insights. More work is needed, and time is short.

William Alberque is the director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Critical minerals have become more crucial than ever for advanced defense technologies, from cutting-edge weaponry to communication systems. The demand for critical minerals has reached unprecedented levels, particularly with the push to electric vehicles and other green technology as the nation moves toward a clean energy future. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook predicts substantial growth in the critical mineral market, expected to rise from $40 billion in 2020 to $280 billion by 2030.

Mine it in America — Securing the US military supply chain

At the same time, the supply of foreign critical minerals is continually under threat by export controls from countries seeking to exert economic pressure. China’s Commerce Ministry recently imposed export controls on gallium and germanium, minerals essential for computer chips and solar panels, and forced buyers to navigate applying for export permits.

To address these risks and regain control over its critical mineral supply chain, the U.S. must prioritize expanding domestic production and sourcing these minerals within its geographic borders, starting in Southwestern states like Arizona. This is essential to bolstering national security and reducing the country’s dependence on potentially hostile foreign suppliers.

Policymakers can advance the country’s critical mineral brain trust by investing in the next generation of mining talent, improving permitting processes, leaning on mining states for environmentally responsible mining techniques, and expanding the definition of critical minerals to include copper.

Investing in the next generation

Despite having abundant reserves, the nation faces a shortage of skilled mining workers essential for critical mineral mining and extraction. The number of accredited mining schools has declined significantly over the years, with only 14 remaining compared to 25 in 1982. These programs only graduate between 300 and 350 B.S. mining engineers per year, while conservative estimates indicate China graduates thousands of engineers for their domestic mining industry every year.

Mining engineering programs are small at most engineering colleges nationwide, given it is not economically viable for most schools to invest in the required infrastructure. Technical schools and community colleges play a key role in helping to grow the U.S. mining workforce.

While Congress has taken some action to address the mining workforce challenge (namely, the introduction of the Mining Schools Act by Sen. John Barrasso (R-WY)), additional federal funding is needed to cultivate the mining talent needed to power U.S. critical mineral production. The federal government must provide substantial funding for the infrastructure higher education institutions need to foster a pipeline of students with the skills and knowledge to enter the mining industry.

Improving permitting processes

Currently, mining projects face significant challenges, as lengthy permitting procedures and red tape means projects can take anywhere from 2-17 years to complete. This pace poses a serious risk to the nation’s ability to reach the critical mineral production levels required to compete globally. Streamlining and expediting the permitting process for critical mineral extraction is essential. Both Canada and Australia have implementedshorter permitting processes, which also incorporate similarly stringent environmental regulations addressing clean water and air.

Southwestern states including Arizona can serve as the blueprint for greener mining practices through existing mining infrastructure, which can be adapted to embrace sustainable methods. These states also demonstrate that it is possible to mine responsibly without compromising ecological integrity with the proper approach and technologies including state-of-art monitoring of water quality, air quality, and stability of built structures.

Additionally, mining is well aligned with circular economy and the mine life cycle no longer ends with closure, but Arizona operators are looking closely at remining of waste and recycling of manufactured waste. Prioritizing environmentally friendly practices will help sway public opinion and illustrate that responsible mining and recycling of materials limit the environmental impact. By tapping into the expertise and innovations of mining states like Arizona, we can develop more sustainable mining practices and move toward a greener future.

Copper as a critical mineral

The U.S. currently does not categorize copper as a critical mineral, despite it being vital to the U.S. economy and a greener future. Adding copper to the official list of critical minerals would help the U.S. take the helm on critical minerals, and may allow for mechanism to prioritize permitting and technology innovation, particularly given that Arizona is one of the top producers of copper globally.

Copper necessitates large, complex, and capital-intensive clean-mining operations, demanding a well-prepared workforce to handle global mineral commodities. The country’s mining universities, technical schools, and community colleges play a vital role in preparing the next generation of mining talent.

Ultimately, expanding domestic production will help the United States reduce its reliance on foreign supplies and mitigate national security risks. Policymakers, decision-makers, and federal agency leaders must invest in mining talent, streamline permitting processes, adopt responsible mining techniques, and broaden the definition of critical minerals to ensure the country can meet the critical mineral demands of the future.

Kray Luxbacher is University of Arizona’s Department Head of Mining and Geological Engineering and serves as the inaugural Gregory H. and Lisa S. Boyce Leadership Chair of Mining and Geological Engineering.

Our nation requires an effective means to deter nuclear threats. This is why the United States has maintained a credible nuclear triad — nuclear-capable bombers, submarines and ICBMs — since the early days of the Cold War. It is time to modernize this enterprise, with the Sentinel program a key component of that effort.

Ironically, if strategic deterrents are effective, most people will never know they exist. That is precisely what has occurred with America’s triad — many take it for granted.

Each of these systems has its own unique strengths. As far as the ICBM leg is concerned, 450 individual U.S.-based missile sites, of which 400 are on alert at any given time, radically complicates an adversary’s decision-making. If an enemy chooses to preemptively launch a nuclear strike against the U.S., it must hit each of these sites, or risk a devastating retaliatory strike. This guards against aggressors with small nuclear weapons inventories. Striking the U.S. homeland directly — not with a bomber in the air or a submarine at sea — also ensures a rapid, decisive response.

For this concept to deter, it must be credible — something increasingly difficult given the present state of the ICBM enterprise. The Minuteman III system was fielded in the early 1970s and only designed to last a decade. It reused silos and crew facilities constructed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. We are overdue for a reset.

Threats like advanced missile defenses and cyberattacks have changed the attributes required for an effective ICBM force. Moreover, the aging physical infrastructure of the missile silos, crew quarters, computers and the cables connecting them must be replaced. With so many other national priorities competing for finite resources, proactively maintaining the ICBM enterprise too often fell below the cut line. As anyone who owns a home knows, upkeep can only be delayed for so long before issues compound and repairs and reconstruction become nonnegotiable. That is exactly where the ICBM enterprise finds itself today.

Nor are these developments occurring in a vacuum. During the Cold War, the U.S. optimized its triad to deter the Soviet Union. Now, the nuclear threat is multipolar: China is radically growing the size of its nuclear forces, Russia is modernizing, plus North Korea and Iran present key planning considerations.

As a former commander of Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, said: “We are witnessing a strategic breakout by China. The explosive growth and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking.” Absent modernization, the U.S. deterrent force will no longer be credible.

The good news is the Department of Defense understands that triad improvements are nonnegotiable. As the undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, Bill LaPlante, said: “Nothing the department does is more important than reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, escalation and arms races. Our ability to do so is backstopped by a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent — and as has been the case for more than six decades, the combination of all three triad legs is the best approach to maintaining strategic stability.”

The Sentinel program includes acquiring new missiles, silos, command-and-control and launch facilities, 7,500 miles of cable, transport vehicles, airborne consoles, training systems, plus its development and test enterprise. The Air Force reports the missile itself is progressing well, with minimal cost growth and a successful engine run this month. Other components are generally on track as well.

The real cost driver is the poor physical condition of existing Minuteman III silos that must be refurbished and other necessary changes like constructing new launch facilities and replacing cabling. The existing infrastructure is in far worse condition than initial estimates anticipated, hence the Nunn-McCurdy overrun.

With the announced increase in future cost estimates factored, the Sentinel program’s unit acquisition cost — which includes the missile, silo, cabling, launch facility and corresponding support equipment for a single site — is increasing from $118 million to $162 million.

While any increase in cost is unfortunate, it is important to place this in perspective. The bottom line is that $162 million for an entire Sentinel system, which will be in service until 2075, is a tremendous value. By comparison, consider that some services are buying conventional long-range missiles that cost over $50 million per shot.

Budgets are tight, which means every defense dollar counts, but the program should not be thought of as “unaffordable,” given the stakes.

Going forward, Sentinel must remain on track. However, the larger challenge will ultimately come down to time. As House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Ala., explained: “The Department must ensure that Sentinel is ready in time to replace the current ICBMs before they reach the end of their lives. Failure is not an option.”

The Department of Defense and Congress must partner to ensure program success and no capability gaps. Now is not the time to take national security risk. To that end, the only thing more costly than sustaining a modern strategic deterrent against nuclear attacks that could devastate the U.S. is not having one at all.

Douglas A. Birkey is the executive director for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

This report is a reminder that the PLA faces significant challenges — and that the United States should use every opportunity to exacerbate those difficulties. But the United States should not use this episode as an excuse to grow complacent.

The preponderance of evidence shows China’s military is still modernizing rapidly, regardless of corruption. Moreover, even if Xi’s confidence in the PLA took a hit last year, he is clearly committed to correcting deficiencies as quickly as possible, and there is a good chance he will succeed.

Mao Zedong said “power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” and Xi Jinping clearly agrees. According to CIA Director William Burns, Xi has directed the PLA to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027, and he has invested China’s resources accordingly. Not only did China prioritize defense spending over other investments during the COVID-19 pandemic, but it also reportedly spends far more on defense than previously understood — perhaps as much as $700 billion per year. At the same time, Xi is personally invested in keeping PLA modernization on track and has significantly improved oversight of the PLA to that end.

The results are clear: The PLA is modernizing rapidly across warfighting domains. China’s air forces, for instance, will enjoy a significant numerical advantage near Taiwan and are increasingly capable, with improving threat sensors and post-processing capabilities, airborne early warning and control aircraft, fifth-generation fighters, and long-range air-to-air missiles.

Meanwhile, China’s naval force is the world’s largest, with highly capable warships and large paramilitary and civilian fleets at its disposal. It is also still growing — quickly — while the U.S. Navy shrinks by the year. Trends may also favor China in space, cyberspace and electronic warfare, and Chinese military exercises are increasingly sophisticated and realistic.

China may struggle in electromagnetic spectrum fighting, Pentagon says

The PLA Rocket Force — the focus of the latest corruption scandal — is making strides, too. China already boasts a massive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, while China’s nuclear forces are on track to nearly quadruple in size in the next decade. China is also at the forefront of missile technology, especially in hypersonics. In 2021, for instance, China shocked the world by testing a fractional orbital bombardment system armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle. According to the U.S. Defense Department, China is probably also developing an additional strategic hypersonic glide vehicle, more survivable intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and a conventional intercontinental missile.

These are impressive accomplishments by any objective measure, and they occurred despite the PLA’s ongoing problems with corruption. Consequently, shocking as these recent revelations are, American policymakers should not bet on corruption to hamstring PLA modernization, nor should they expect corruption or the effects of it to stay Xi’s hand. If they want to avoid war, they must instead take China seriously and prioritize investing in America’s ability to deter this powerful rival.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration has made clear it wants to focus less on China amid other geopolitical crises and the upcoming presidential election. To that end, the administration has routinely downplayed Chinese threats, from the Chinese spy balloon to the declassification of intelligence about the origin of COVID-19.

Indeed, the timing and content of the recent revelations suggest they are part of a similar campaign to ease pressure on the administration to confront China. But Beijing is not waiting.

The administration may not want to confront China, but Xi Jinping is clearly preparing for war with the United States. So long as the administration is determined to avoid doing what is required to deter China, then risk of conflict will only grow.

Alex Velez-Green is a senior policy adviser with the Allison Center for National Security at the Heritage Foundation think tank. He previously served as national security adviser to Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo.

The good news is that the United States is making progress on its own offensive hypersonic weapons. The bad news is that American efforts to develop systems that can defend against Chinese hypersonic capabilities are not keeping pace. If Washington does not act quickly to expedite the Pentagon’s fielding of hypersonic missile defense capabilities, deterrence may fail in the Pacific.

A hypersonic weapon is a missile that travels at speeds above Mach 5, or greater than 1 mile per second. There are many existing ballistic missile systems that travel at hypersonic speeds, but Chinese hypersonic missiles present an additional challenge. In addition to their high speeds, these systems include hypersonic glide vehicles, which maneuver through the atmosphere after an initial ballistic launch phase. To make matters worse, Beijing is also developing hypersonic cruise missiles that use air-breathing engines such as scramjets to reach high speeds and maneuver.

That combination of speed and maneuverability presents a daunting challenge for existing U.S. ballistic and cruise missile defense radars and interceptors, making it difficult to track and destroy the adversary’s incoming glide vehicle or cruise missile. The fact that hypersonic glide vehicles can also operate at unusual altitudes — well above cruise missiles but below ballistic missiles — adds an additional layer of complexity.

Drag race: hypersonic threats are slow enough for US missile defenses

China has several hypersonic variants that leverage their extensive work in both intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. That includes, for example, the deployed DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle that has a reported range of 1,600 kilometers. Beijing could use that system to target American and allied military bases and fleets in the Pacific.

To match China’s effort, the United States has spent more than $8 billion on offensive hypersonic missile development over the past two years alone. Despite delays and challenges, some of these efforts are making headway. The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, the Air Force’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile, and the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike and Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare programs could all field weapons this decade.

Unfortunately, America’s hypersonic defense efforts are not nearly as impressive.

The Missile Defense Agency has invested in developing a glide-phase interceptor to destroy adversarial missiles in their vulnerable glide phase, before they start complex maneuvering in the terminal phase. But the Biden administration only asked for $209 million for hypersonic defense programs in its fiscal 2024 budget request, and the Pentagon requested less than $515 million in funding in fiscal 2022 and fiscal 2023 combined.

These requests are a fraction of the funding dedicated to offensive capabilities and well short of what is required. This failure to prioritize hypersonic defense has consequences: The Department of Defense said in April that it did not expect to field a hypersonic defense system until fiscal 2034.

That delay creates unacceptable risk for American forces and invites aggression.

So what’s going on?

In part, it appears that out of an abundance of caution dissonant with the urgency of the threat that Americans confront, as well as a perennial fear of acquisition failure, the Pentagon has delayed a decision to select one defense company to begin an operational test and development effort that could lead to a functional deployed system before the end of the decade.

The Pentagon may be delaying this so-called downselect decision until a second program can be brought into a full competition, adding years of delay. That’s a mistake. If there is any current research and development effort that warrants risk taking, hypersonic missile defense is it.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks has emphasized in recent months that the Pentagon is prioritizing efforts to field key combat capabilities, especially when it comes to closing the gap with China in key emerging technology areas. But some are concerned that is more rhetorical than reality.

Thankfully, Congress has stepped in to begin to address this challenge. In this year’s National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed MDA to achieve an initial operating capability for a glide-phase intercept system by 2029 and authorized an additional $225 million in research and development funding for 2024, more than doubling the amount the administration requested.

As the congressional appropriators conference their different versions of the defense bill, they should appropriate the full authorized amount. Then the DoD needs to quickly select one company for a rapid acquisition effort as soon as feasible. If the Pentagon believes that decision alone is too risky, it could also fund a second research and development effort that delivers in the 2030s.

As the DoD develops its 2025 missile defense budget request, it should reflect these increased investments and not rely once again on congressional intervention, which would only cause additional delay.

Most strategists understand that a military can best deter aggression by fielding both capable offensive and defensive systems. After all, offensive capabilities force the potential aggressor to consider costly counterpunches the aggression may invite, and defensive capabilities create uncertainty as to whether the aggression can achieve its military objectives. Individually, these offensive and defensive capabilities are significant deterrents, but together they are much more effective. That’s why Washington should prioritize hypersonic missile defense before it is too late.

Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and as director of operations (J3) at U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He previously served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and was an officer in the U.S. Army.

Recent maritime events underscore the importance of continuous global naval operations. They have also reignited debates about how best to employ forces without overcommitting or burning them out.

With demand unlikely to ebb, increasing the operational availability of our current supply of forces — especially those ships already deployed — becomes paramount. Vast ocean distances that take weeks to traverse make the ability to regenerate forces quickly a critical enabler for mission success.

Such a task is difficult in peacetime because a shrunken defense-industrial base has left few domestic shipyards capable of performing maintenance. The Government Accountability Office asserts this has induced backlogs and cost overruns as well as contributed to some ship decommissioning recommendations that combine to strain capacity. Cumulative “maintenance delay days” dropped in fiscal 2023, but the job gets harder in wartime.

While the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan is a start, improvements are estimated to cost $21 billion and take 20 years to implement. This has led some prominent voices to support “shifting funds from shipbuilding to modernizing U.S. shipyards” to keep “the existing fleet as lethal as it can be.”

Meanwhile, reconstituting the Navy’s once robust, in-theater expeditionary ship repair capabilities can help overcome domestic constraints and answer the National Security Strategy’s charge to build “a combat-credible military.” Some such efforts are underway, but further strategic and policy choices can deliver the operational benefits sooner.

First, reexamine current and future platform requirements to incorporate organic ship repair capabilities wherever feasible. For example, repurposing in-service expeditionary sea base ships could transform them into floating repair facilities. These vessels, like those in the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, contain expansive spaces suitable for large workshops, machinery overhaul, additive manufacturing technology, parts storerooms and command posts. Their mobility also reduces risks associated with permanent infrastructure.

Looking to the horizon, resourcing experts should explore whether the submarine tender replacement could also perform intermediate-level surface ship maintenance. Though hard to envision a return to 1945 when the fleet included nearly 200 repair-type ships, FY24 initial procurement funding still affords planners time to evaluate the next-generation tender’s utility and quantity before its estimated delivery toward the end of the decade.

Second, reconsider engineering development and systems fielding strategies to emphasize reliability and flexibility. The GAO observed: “Modern warships have intricate electrical, radar, and computer systems that did not exist on World War II-era warships, making damage assessment and repair of modern ships significantly more complex.” Therefore, a back-to-the-future approach to de-digitize and re-analog certain components could enhance redundancy, streamline assessments and support faster work.

Such simplification could also spur unpalatable, but important discussions among engineers and operators to return functional, but imperfect mission-capable combatants to service — just as the Navy did with the aircraft carrier Yorktown in 1942 so it could fight at Midway.

Additionally, Navy warfare centers and program offices should use modeling, simulation, threat-centric planning and artificial intelligence to predict ship vulnerabilities. By understanding how and to what extent adversarial armaments could inflict damage, engineers and logisticians could pre-stage the forecast tools, parts, materials and personnel to undertake mission-critical repairs.

Third, reorganize the maintenance community to form deployable repair detachments. In this construct, a program manager-experienced officer could lead a team of uniformed and civilian specialists and stage aboard forward-operating auxiliaries to conduct on-scene repair assessments, oversee towing or salvage, and orchestrate preventive and corrective work.

In 2022, the Navy’s largest intermediate-level regional maintenance center in San Diego, California, established an expeditionary maintenance department to support scheduled littoral combat ship voyage repairs. This model could be mirrored in other regions and expanded to incorporate in-theater crisis response.

Fourth, appeal to Congress to amend public law, which currently prohibits U.S.-homeported ships from undergoing maintenance in foreign shipyards except for mid-deployment voyage repairs or to correct battle damage. While the U.S. Navy operates public ship repair facilities in Japan and contracts with private yards in Bahrain and Spain to fix forward-deployed vessels stationed there, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro acknowledged: “The intense repair-and-revive demands of a high-end conflict in Asia will require significant shipyard capacity in the Pacific.” This is why his maritime statecraft approach includes increasing throughput by using previously untapped shipyards — public, private, at home and abroad — to expand in-theater maintenance options with likeminded and capable partners. This is particularly important in ports with dry-docks, which are vital to repairing external hull, propulsion, steering, and underwater damage.

Moreover, thanks to foreign military sales, many Indo-Pacific navies operate American engineering equipment, combat systems and weaponry — commonality that creates economies of scale in the transfer of parts, personnel and expertise. These reasons explain why U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has championed a collective approach, noting: “American warships shouldn’t be sailing home for repairs when a trusted ally can do the job.”

It would be sensible to test these options in peacetime before the U.S. urgently needs them.

Lastly, ask Congress to authorize the creation of a new four-star Navy Materiel Command — akin to the Army and Air Force Materiel commands. Many complex shipboard programs — for example, IT infrastructure or aviation facilities — have multiple two- and three-star program, systems, type and installation command stakeholders with overlapping or ambiguous jurisdiction. Though seemingly counterintuitive, an added layer of authorities would better integrate repair efforts by synchronizing approaches, assigning accountability and streamlining decision-making.

As Secretary Del Toro affirmed, the ability “to do forward-based repair and maintenance is critical” to the Navy’s mission. In a protracted conflict far from home, every contributor will count. But while preserving a domestic ship repair industry is a national security interest, limited shipyard options justify a new approach.

Revitalizing in-theater expeditionary ship repair capabilities can harness the agility, mobility and scalability that are hallmark advantages of naval power so that if called upon, our ships can sail to the battle line — and stay there.

Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.

This is the third commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is here, and the second here.

First, current policy has restrained the Space Force from generating the requirements and resource requests necessary to achieve a credible deterrence and warfighting Space Force. Instead, current policy and strategic frameworks like the U.S. Space Priorities Framework focuses the service on enable and support missions for the joint force (i.e., terrestrial military operations). As a result, the service has not developed space deterrence and warfighting force postures that enable space superiority against our adversaries, but rather have continued on the path of graceful degradation via under attack.

This type of thinking, while arguably rational for the 1990s, is wholly inadequate for an era of rapidly developing and deploying Chinese, Russian, and Iranian space forces and ongoing counterspace operations against the U.S. and its allies. These operations, while non-kinetic, occur “every single day,” according to former vice chief of space operations, Gen. David Thompson.

Second, due to this mentality of supporting the joint force, the service is not deploying the weapons systems necessary for a credible deterrent against a near peer like China. Regardless of what side of the counter-space continuum you look (non-kinetic or kinetic), the Space Force either does not have the variety of anti-satellite and counter-space weapons systems to match what the adversary is deploying, or lacks sufficient numbers to have any real effect in a major great power conflict.

For example, China has deployed or is expected to deploy in the near term kinetic anti-satellite missile units; jammers of various kinds (satellite communications, GPS, etc.); and on-orbit anti-satellite technology, including those capable of aggressive rendezvous and proximity operations as well as the ability to capture and move U.S. and allied assets from their orbital posts and into disposal orbits.

If that was not enough, China has also demonstrated its capability and willingness to use a fractional orbital bombardment system equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles with either conventional or nuclear payloads. This provides China with escalation dominance, which is key to credible deterrence in a great power competition environment.

As an example of how we lack credible numbers of counter-space weapons, the Space Force has a few Counter Communications System and Bounty Hunter jamming systems. These weapons systems, while supporting combatant commander requirements over the past few decades, exist in insufficient numbers to have much effect in a great power war in the Pacific. Even if all of these units were deployed to the Indo-Pacific region, there are not enough to address all adversarial orbital targets overflying the operating areas of U.S. terrestrial forces and our allies. As a result, we are putting our guardians in harm’s way without sufficient equipment to achieve meaningful effects in combat, much less the ability to gain space superiority in a high-stakes conflict.

Third is the budget for the service. While many have lauded the largest budget increases for the Space Force, the priorities and resources are insufficient. The majority of the budget is research and development, which is fine, but it is beyond time to move more capability into operational and maintenance lines and deploy capabilities for deterrence and warfighting, not just for continued space-support missions.

Finally, the Space Force is hindered by law from recruiting sufficient military personnel due to congressional limitations imposed before its establishment in 2019. This has led to insufficient numbers of trained personnel to operate space support, space deterrence and warfighting systems needed to defend American interests in space. Thus, a never-ending cycle of re-optimizing the service or military departments happens every few years to make it look like major changes are being made, when in reality the service is just trying to find ways to do more with less.

This passive and inadequate approach will cede freedom of access and maneuver advantage in space to the adversaries of this nation and its friends. Congress should act quickly to remedy this situation and require the development of true warfighting capabilities necessary for the Space Force to be a fully coequal provider of combat forces in the joint force and not simply a service provider.

The Space Force was established to address the threat in space, not to be the help desk of the other services. The Space Force must have the funding, personnel and, most of all, the weapons to address the threats facing our nation today and into the future.

Christopher Stone is a senior fellow for space deterrence studies at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies think tank. He previously served as special assistant to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy. This commentary does not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Defense Department.

The Department of Defense on Thursday released what it labeled a first-of-its-kind National Defense Industrial Strategy. As with most such strategies, this one falls short in providing the unafraid look at root causes and specific actions needed for rapid, measurable and sustainable improvement. But within the pages there are rays of hope and seeds for the all-important implementation plans.

The strategy does a good job describing the problem in a way that acknowledges some culpability in creating it, something previous reports from the Pentagon did not do.

Unfortunately the more blunt and useful problem characterizations that appeared in a November draft of the report are now missing in the final version. For example, in that draft report, the DoD acknowledged that, in part due to its own policy in the early 1990s encouraging consolidation among defense contractors, “today’s [defense-industrial base] would be challenged to provide the required capabilities at the speed and scale necessary for the U.S. military and our allies and partners to engage and prevail in a major conflict.” This statement is missing from the final version of the report.

The strategy rightly concludes the current threat environment necessitates aggressive innovation of next-generation capabilities while also continuing to upgrade and produce large volumes of existing conventional systems.

It then makes the critical connection between the problem and the budget, noting the shrinking defense share of the nation’s gross domestic product has resulted in “corresponding contractions of defense-oriented companies and a reduction of nearly two-thirds of the associated workforce.” The document also clearly points to the uncertainty of DoD funding as inhibiting domestic production capacity necessary to meet the nation’s needs.

The strategy falls short by continuing to recast old solutions as new ones, rather proposing the type of corrections to current buying practices that would support industrial vibrancy. It fails to update faulty assumptions about likely attrition of equipment during conflict and neglects to lay out new, actionable and measurable solutions within the DoD’s scope of control. These failures also further highlight disconnects between policy, programming and budgeting within the DoD, and the inadequacy of the budget in supporting the now dangerously outdated national security and defense strategies.

The Pentagon should update these strategies, propose budgets actually sufficient to support them, focus on its core functions, modernize its resourcing and acquisition processes, and prioritize procurement of both capability and capacity.

For too long the DoD has tried to pretend it can keep doing what it has been doing — and doing it within budgets it knows are too low. To cover for these deficiencies, it has tried to say it can reduce the force now in exchange for increasing capability later while still meeting strategic objectives. We can clearly see those trade-offs don’t work — not for the force, not for the mission, and not for industry or the nation.

The DoD then compounds the fiction in this new strategy by saying it needs to “optimize defense needs in the competitive landscape,” rather than supporting industry in meeting its needs with defined and funded requirements. The strategy further focuses attention on elements of the problem that are either not within its purview to solve or that it should not even be focused on fixing, such as the fictitious stigma of industrial jobs.

As for next steps, the DoD should rapidly complete the referenced implementation plans to include the following four basic measures of progress.

First, is the number of companies willing to do business with the DoD growing or shrinking? If efforts are having a positive impact, industry will be clamoring to work with the DoD, not running from the department as it is doing now.

Second, is production capacity up? There are numerous supporting measures related to material stockpiles, munitions, people eligible to work in shipyards, and outputs of air, sea, ground and space platforms.

Third, is the budget for stated industrial base priorities up or down? If the strategy is not visible in the budget, where is the disconnect?

And finally, the ultimate measure: Is the force trained, equipped and ready with the right modern capabilities and a stockpile of munitions, missiles and supplies to carry out the missions and contingencies assigned to it?

America’s creativity and capacity in producing defense capabilities is central to our national security and to the economic vitality that supports it. Yet, for decades we have witnessed, analyzed and misunderstood the struggles that created the crises we face today. The new strategy contains useful words about the problem. Those words must be quickly put into measurable and funded actions.

Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. She previously served as the Pentagon’s deputy undersecretary of defense (comptroller) as well as acting undersecretary of defense (comptroller).

With the success of Vulcan, there are now two U.S. companies — ULA and SpaceX — offering heavy-lift launch capabilities using U.S.-assembled rockets with U.S.-manufactured engines. These companies, hopefully joined soon by Blue Origin with its own heavy-lift rocket, will create competition in U.S. launch services and strengthen the ability of U.S. companies to compete with their Chinese peers for global customers.

Therefore, the Vulcan launch and engine development should be considered a success story for U.S. industrial policy.

Arguably, one decision made in the mid-1990s led directly to the Vulcan: the decision to use a Russian-made rocket engine, called the RD-180, as the primary engine for the Atlas III and, later, Atlas V rockets. Given the current geopolitical climate, it is impossible to imagine a U.S. defense contractor turning to Russia — or perhaps any foreign company — as the supplier for a component so critical to U.S. national security. But the world looked different then, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. sought to stabilize the economies of what were hoped to be the Soviet Union’s democratic successor states, including Russia, and mitigate concerns about unbought space and rocket technology proliferating to countries like Iran and North Korea.

In 2014, 12 years after the first launch of an Atlas V, then a cornerstone of the U.S. national security launch architecture, Russia invaded Ukraine. In response to engine supply chain concerns resulting from Russia’s actions and worsening U.S.-Russian relations, Congress directed the U.S. Air Force to start a program to develop and field a new U.S.-designed engine and stop using the RD-180.

Though Congress mandated that the Department of Defense produce a replacement domestic engine for use on military launches starting in 2019, the first flight of the replacement engine — Blue Origin’s BE-4 — was the inaugural Vulcan launch. Meanwhile, in 2015, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 was certified for military launch contracts, and the company quickly established itself as a reliable government launch partner.

Though delayed by almost five years, the successful Vulcan launch and performance of the BE-4 engine is a U.S. space milestone worth celebrating, reflecting the strength of the U.S. space-industrial base. The rocket’s success is also a success of U.S. industrial policy, and is the result of significant government and private sector investment. Some of that investment went to develop a different engine, Aerojet Rocketdyne’s AR1, which was not used on Vulcan. There is, however, some interest in using the AR1, which was completed by Aerojet Rocketdyne, to power a different U.S.-made rocket, one produced by Firefly Aerospace.

But no matter AR1′s fate, investment in an RD-180 replacement has not only met its primary goal, disentangling U.S. national security launch capabilities from a Russian supplier, but also set the stage for a diverse and competitive U.S. launch provider ecosystem, which will benefit not only the U.S. government but commercial space customers in the U.S. and around the world.

Two companies now offer heavy-lift rockets assembled in the U.S. using American-made engines: SpaceX and ULA. Moreover, U.S. investment helped pave the way for a third capability, Blue Origin’s upcoming New Glenn heavy-launch vehicle, which will also use the BE-4 engine. Relatedly, other U.S. launch providers, such as Rocket Lab and Relativity Space, are also developing similar capabilities.

While SpaceX has demonstrated it can launch at scale, with close to 100 launches last year, now ULA and Blue Origin will have to demonstrate the same repeatability and consistency for Vulcan and BE-4. The goal should be multiple successful U.S. launch providers, offering cost-competitive launch services to global government and private sector customers, as this strengthens the U.S. industrial base, supports high-tech U.S. jobs and grows the U.S. space economy.

China is eyeing commercial customers — the first Chinese commercial launch happened last year — and is likely to follow the same playbook as it did with 5G technologies to capture a share of the global launch market. If U.S. launch companies are to compete and successfully win business around the world, they must offer better, cost-effective solutions than Chinese providers, who in many cases are state-owned or -backed enterprises. With the advent of the Ariane 6, Europe too will have a new heavy-lift capability that competes for many of the same customers.

While the U.S. government cannot subsidize every good idea from a space startup, it can make strategic investments that aim to not only meet national security requirements but also lay a foundation for the commercial success of American space companies in the U.S. and abroad.

Government funding and support to U.S. space companies can also encourage more private investment in these same endeavors, creating a flywheel effect and injecting more capital into initiatives seeking to develop advanced space technologies.

As the DoD nears the release of its first national defense industrial strategy, and soon pivots to implementation, policymakers should consider the Vulcan launch, albeit delayed, as a success story. In this case, the government had a clear goal to replace the weakest point of the supply chain for a critical U.S. national security capability. While meeting that primary objective, the government also strengthened the overall capabilities of the U.S. space industry and positioned it better to compete with China.

Policymakers should discern lessons learned along the decade-long journey that culminated in the Vulcan’s successful launch, and identify where and how to apply future investments to strengthen our security and increase the global competitiveness of U.S. companies.

Clayton Swope is deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. He previously led national security and cybersecurity public policy for Amazon’s Project Kuiper; served as a senior adviser on national security, space, foreign affairs and technology policy issues for a U.S. representative; and worked at the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology.

Critical minerals have become more crucial than ever for advanced defense technologies, from cutting-edge weaponry to communication systems. The demand for critical minerals has reached unprecedented levels, particularly with the push to electric vehicles and other green technology as the nation moves toward a clean energy future. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook predicts substantial growth in the critical mineral market, expected to rise from $40 billion in 2020 to $280 billion by 2030.

At the same time, the supply of foreign critical minerals is continually under threat by export controls from countries seeking to exert economic pressure. The China Commerce Ministry recently imposed export controls on gallium and germanium, minerals essential for computer chips and solar panels, and forced buyers to navigate applying for export permits.

To address these risks and regain control over its critical mineral supply chain, the United States must prioritize expanding domestic production and sourcing these minerals within its geographic borders, starting in Southwestern states like Arizona. This is essential to bolstering national security and reducing the country’s dependence on potentially hostile foreign suppliers.

Policymakers can advance the country’s critical mineral brain trust by investing in the next generation of mining talent, improving permitting processes, leaning on mining states for environmentally responsible mining techniques, and expanding the definition of critical minerals to include copper.

Securing mining talent

Despite having abundant reserves, the nation faces a shortage of skilled mining workers essential for critical mineral mining and extraction. The number of accredited mining schools has declined significantly over the years, with only 14 remaining compared to 25 in 1982. These programs only graduate between 300 and 350 B.S. mining engineers per year, while conservative estimates indicate China graduates thousands of engineers for their domestic mining industry every year. Mining engineering programs are small at most engineering colleges nationwide, given it is not economically viable for most schools to invest in the required infrastructure. Technical schools and community colleges play a key role in helping to grow the U.S. mining workforce.

While Congress has taken some action to address the mining workforce challenge (namely, the introduction of the Mining Schools Act by Sen. John Barrasso (R-WY)), additional federal funding is needed to cultivate the mining talent needed to power U.S. critical mineral production. The federal government must provide substantial funding for the infrastructure higher education institutions need to foster a pipeline of students with the skills and knowledge to enter the mining industry.

Improving permitting processes

Currently, mining projects face significant challenges, as lengthy permitting procedures and red tape means projects can take anywhere from 2-17 years to complete. This pace poses a serious risk to the nation’s ability to reach the critical mineral production levels required to compete globally. Streamlining and expediting the permitting process for critical mineral extraction is essential. Both Canada and Australia have implementedshorter permitting processes, which also incorporate similarly stringent environmental regulations addressing clean water and air.

Environmental responsibility

Southwestern states like Arizona can serve as the blueprint for greener mining practices through existing mining infrastructure, which can be adapted to embrace sustainable methods. These states also demonstrate that it is possible to mine responsibly without compromising ecological integrity with the proper approach and technologies including state-of-art monitoring of water quality, air quality, and stability of built structures. Additionally, mining is well aligned with circular economy and the mine life cycle no longer ends with closure, but Arizona operators are looking closely at remining of waste and recycling of manufactured waste. Prioritizing environmentally friendly practices will help sway public opinion and illustrate that responsible mining and recycling of materials limit the environmental impact. By tapping into the expertise and innovations of mining states like Arizona, we can develop more sustainable mining practices and move toward a greener future.

Copper as a critical mineral

The U.S. does not categorize copper as a critical mineral, despite it being vital to the economy and a greener future. Adding copper to the official list of critical minerals would help the U.S. take the helm on critical minerals, and may allow for mechanism to prioritize permitting and technology innovation, particularly given that Arizona is one of the top producers of copper globally.

Copper necessitates large, complex, and capital-intensive clean-mining operations, demanding a well-prepared workforce to handle global mineral commodities. The country’s mining universities, technical schools, and community colleges play a vital role in preparing the next generation of mining talent.

Ultimately, expanding domestic production will help the United States reduce its reliance on foreign supplies and mitigate national security risks. Policymakers, decision-makers, and federal agency leaders must invest in mining talent, streamline permitting processes, adopt responsible mining techniques, and broaden the definition of critical minerals to ensure the country can meet the critical mineral demands of the future.

Kray Luxbacher is the University of Arizona’s Department Head of Mining and Geological Engineering and serves as the inaugural Gregory H. and Lisa S. Boyce Leadership Chair of Mining and Geological Engineering.

Yet, change in military doctrine is coming. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks is navigating the tightrope of competing interests to make it happen — hopefully in time.

There are several theories of how innovation in military doctrine and new operational concepts occur. Some argue new doctrine emerges when civilians intervene to assist military “mavericks,” e.g., the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Or a military service can generate innovation internally when senior military officers recognize the doctrinal and operational implications of new capabilities, e.g., Rickover and the Nuclear Navy.

But today, innovation in doctrine and concepts is driven by four major external upheavals that simultaneously threaten our military and economic advantage:

1. China delivering multiple asymmetric offset strategies.
2. China fielding naval, space and air assets in unprecedented numbers.
3. The proven value of a massive number of attritable uncrewed systems on the Ukrainian battlefield.
4. Rapid technological change in artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, space, biotechnology, semiconductors, hypersonics, etc., with many driven by commercial companies in the U.S. and China.

The U.S. Defense Department’s traditional sources of innovation are no longer sufficient by themselves to keep pace. The speed, depth and breadth of these disruptive changes happen faster than the responsiveness and agility of our current acquisition systems and defense-industrial base. However, in the decade since these external threats emerged, the DoD’s doctrine, organization, culture, process and tolerance for risk mostly operated as though nothing substantial needed to change.

The result is that the DoD has world-class people and organizations for a world that no longer exists.

It isn’t that the DoD doesn’t know how to innovate on the battlefield. In Iraq and Afghanistan, innovative, crisis-driven organizations appeared, such as the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency and the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force. And armed services have bypassed their own bureaucracy by creating rapid capabilities offices. Even today, the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine rapidly delivers weapons.

Unfortunately, these efforts are siloed and ephemeral, disappearing when the immediate crisis is over; they rarely make permanent change at the DoD.

But in the past year, several signs of meaningful change show the DoD is serious about changing how it operates and radically overhauling its doctrine, concepts and weapons.

First, the Defense Innovation Unit was elevated to report to the defense secretary. Previously hobbled with a $35 million budget and buried inside the research and engineering organization, its budget and reporting structure were signs of how little the DoD viewed the importance of commercial innovation.

Now, with DIU rescued from obscurity, its new director drives the Deputy’s Innovation Working Group, which oversees defense efforts to rapidly field high-tech capabilities to address urgent operational problems. DIU also put staff in the Navy and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to discover actual urgent needs.

Furthermore, the House Appropriations Committee signaled the importance of DIU with a proposed fiscal 2024 budget of $1 billion to fund these efforts. And the Navy has signaled, through the creation of the Disruptive Capabilities Office, that it intends to fully participate with DIU.

In addition, Deputy Defense Secretary Hicks unveiled the Replicator initiative, meant to deploy thousands of attritable autonomous systems within the next 18 to 24 months. The initiative is the first test of the steering group’s ability to deliver autonomous systems to warfighters at speed and scale while breaking down organizational barriers. DIU will work with new companies to address anti-access/area denial problems for these drones.

Replicator: An inside look at the Pentagon’s ambitious drone program

Replicator is a harbinger of fundamental DoD doctrinal changes as well as a solid signal to the defense-industrial base that the DoD is serious about procuring components faster, cheaper and with a shorter shelf life.

Finally, at the recent Reagan National Defense Forum, the world felt like it turned upside down. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin talked about DIU in his keynote address and came to Reagan immediately following a visit to its headquarters in Silicon Valley, where he met with innovative companies. On many panels, high-ranking officers and senior defense officials used the words “disruption,” “innovation,” “speed” and “urgency” so many times, signaling they really meant it and wanted it.

In the audience were a plethora of venture and private capital fund leaders looking for ways build companies that would deliver innovative capabilities with speed.

Conspicuously, unlike in previous years, sponsor banners at the conference were not incumbent prime contractors but rather insurgents — new potential new primes like Palantir and Anduril.

The DoD is awake. It has realized new and escalating threats require rapid change, or we may not prevail in the next conflict.

Change is hard, especially in military doctrine. Incumbent suppliers don’t go quietly into the night, and new suppliers almost always underestimate the difficulty and complexity of a task. Existing organizations defend their budget, headcount and authority. Organization saboteurs resist change. But adversaries don’t wait for our decades-out plans.

Congress and the military services can support change by fully funding the Replicator initiative and DIU. The services have no procurement budget for Replicator, and they’ll have to shift existing funds to unmanned and AI programs.

The DoD should turn its new innovation process into actual, orders for new companies. And other combatant commands should follow what INDOPACOM is doing.

In addition, defense primes should more often aggressively partner with startups.

Change is in the air. Deputy Defense Secretary Hicks is building a coalition of the willing to get it done. Here’s to hoping it happens in time.

Steve Blank is a co-founder of the Stanford Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. He previously served on the Defense Business Board.

The three nations have been fighting alongside each other for decades, dating back to the 1940s. Yet today, we still experience difficulties at the most tactical level to communicate with each other. We live in an era where any individual in the world can go on their mobile device, type a message, have it translated into any language and send it nearly instantly to a recipient anywhere in the world. And yet when it comes to our military command and control, we have not yet solved this form of communication, boding ill for military-to-military collaboration within AUKUS.

This is an all the more pressing problem to fix because in warfighting today, as is the case in our daily lives, the connected Internet of Things is driving the revolution in productivity and effectiveness. If AUKUS does nothing other than seamlessly knit together existing weapon systems across the three nations, it will be a huge success.

Japan, South Korea and the US should mirror AUKUS for destroyers

The other issue is at the same time simpler and yet much more complex: Our industrial partners cannot easily talk to each other. Putting up the most formidable walls between the industrial bases of all three AUKUS nations is the United States’ rules codified in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations regime, or ITAR, which threatens to derail defense collaboration. Australia is now making its own attempt to reform its defense export controls, but that effort looks to be a replication of all the bad parts of ITAR, as Bill Greenwalt has also noted.

Reform in this area is extremely important because U.S. and Australian engineers cannot easily share information, thereby destroying the fruits to be gained from cooperation.

So besides current reform efforts included in the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act, what’s there to do to ensure that defense cooperation, both on the industrial and military levels, can actually happen within AUKUS?

First, AUKUS’ participating defense industries should be treated the same. In other words, a company working on a hypersonic project in the U.K., Australia or the U.S. should have the same opportunity to supply the AUKUS nations with that technology as they would in their home country. That will help drive competition between the countries’ industries in a non-protectionist manner, and hopefully lower costs and barriers to access for the technology areas covered by AUKUS’ second pillar.

Second, as part of that push to lower the barriers between industries, Congress should consider enshrining a “Buy AUKUS” provision in future legislation. That would move beyond harmful “Buy America” provisions, which favor the purchase of American-made and -sourced defense articles over those from foreign countries, and focus on buying defense articles from within the AUKUS partnership. That could in turn help revitalize the defense-industrial bases of all three nations and enable second sourcing and “friendshoring” of our defense supply chains.

Third, AUKUS will simply not work, and industry collaboration won’t work either, absent sustained funding from Congress. We need sustained funding for a whole host of AUKUS projects, especially for those undertaken by our submarine-industrial base or for attempts to make our current weapons interoperable.

As Mackenzie Eaglen has rightly argued: “The President and Congress must go beyond one-off supplemental measures and provide our Navy with robust and stable budgetary investments for the critical years to come.” How much money to appropriate is up to Congress, but it should surely go beyond the $3.4 billion requested by the administration in its October 2023 supplemental request and likely track the figure put out in the yet-to-be-publicly-released Pentagon study on the submarine-industrial base.

Absent sustained funding, industry simply will not invest in producing the 100,000 new hires (and facilities) that the Navy estimates the submarine-industrial base needs over the next decade.

In the end, though, there’s a near-endless list of policy prescriptions to help make AUKUS a success — and there’s more that should be added to the list. Without focusing on the smaller and solvable items first, AUKUS and its promise of submarines and emerging technologies may just fizzle out.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army. Charles Rahr is a research assistant at AEI.

It feels much longer than three years ago that President Joe Biden on Feb. 4, 2021, gave a major foreign policy speech at the State Department, stressing a commitment to democracy and the aforementioned pledge on limiting support to Saudi Arabia. Later in that first year, he made the difficult decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in an apparent effort to extract the United States from what were being called endless wars. He also broke with his predecessor’s approach and committed the country to an international political declaration that sought to better protect civilians in populated areas from the harm caused by explosive weapons, adopted in November 2021.

In December 2021, he championed the creation of and hosted the Summit for Democracy in an effort to promote shared values for human rights — (and co-hosted again in 2023).

As early as 2021, his administration also hinted at a new conventional arms transfer policy. Released in February 2023, it includes a standard that, if implemented, would mean U.S. arms would not be provided to countries that are “more likely than not” to use them for a range of abuses, including “attacks intentionally directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such; or other serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law.”

All of the above, including additional Defense Department guidance announced this month furthering better civilian harm and response policies, indicates an administration seeking to restrain problematic weapons sales and militarized approaches.

Toward the end of 2021, however, it became clear Russia might invade Ukraine, and the Biden administration began an effort to arm Kyiv that has been central to his presidency. Just this week, the Defense Department announced another $250 million in new military assistance to Ukraine, marking the 54th drawdown from U.S. stocks and more than $44 billion in total U.S. military assistance since Russia’s Feb. 24, 2022, invasion.

While the U.S. media, the public and the global response to Ukraine’s warfighting has not been nearly as critical as they have of Israel’s in Gaza, Biden’s support for Ukraine has undermined initial efforts at restraint.

As the war has progressed, his administration has authorized the transfer of weapons it originally held back, whether that be tanks, more sophisticated and longer-range weapons, or F-16 fighter jets that are expected soon (with U.S. blessing). No decision was perhaps more problematic than the summer 2023 decision to provide cluster munitions, an indiscriminate weapon banned by more than 110 states parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including the vast majority of America’s NATO allies.

F-16s are no magic bullets in Ukraine, but their armaments will matter

Whether current — primarily Republican — opposition to the president’s latest roughly $60 billion supplemental aid request for Ukraine is based on actual concern about U.S. weapons exports or instead a way to exact a political cost and change border policy, the fight for approval has also seen the president and his advisers more fully adopt language that makes future restraint more difficult: namely, the argument that defense production is good for the economy.

In his Oct. 19 address to the nation, Biden said that “patriotic American workers are building the arsenal of democracy” and listed states where weapons were produced. Since then, U.S. officials have more fully emphasized the economic benefit of weapons production. While the evidence suggests government expenditures in activities other than defense create many more jobs, a greater challenge with taking this approach is that it makes it harder in the future to promote restraint. Doing so requires addressing arguments about job losses, when arms trade decisions should truly be based on security and other concerns.

A partial indication of a ramped-up arms trade is that in 2022 and 2023, the Biden administration notified Congress of more than $188 billion in government-to-government foreign military sales, including more than $106 billion in 2023 alone — a dramatic increase compared to $36 billion in 2021. In part to resupply allies for their contributions to Ukraine or to move others off legacy Soviet or Russian systems, more than half of those potential sales are to NATO countries. Yet, included also are nearly $30 billion in arms and services to countries not invited to the 2021 or 2023 Summit for Democracy events — a failure to align democratic ideals with policy practice.

During the course of the war, the president has also walked back from the distance he tried to maintain with Saudi Arabia. He famously fist-bumped Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in July 2022, who still went on to work with Russia months later to keep oil prices high.

And until the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, the president’s team appeared to be promoting a grand bargain that would provide more weapons and defense guarantees to Saudi Arabia in an effort to expand the Abraham Accords to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations. While that deal may appear unlikely at this moment, it may reemerge in the coming months.

His administration has already notified Congress of more than $6 billion in arms and services to Saudi Arabia via the FMS process, including $1 billion in training buried by being announced the Friday before Christmas. Media are also reporting the administration is seriously considering the resumption of “offensive” weapon transfers that have thus far been withheld. New transfers or a grand new bargain with Saudi Arabia in 2024 could indicate just how little restraint the president puts on the arms trade to repressive countries that have shown no real progress in promoting human rights.

It is, however, support to Israel that is testing U.S. commitments to a more humane arms trade policy. Recognizing that Hamas’ attacks on Israeli citizens is odious and merits condemnation does not require approval of an Israeli response that has destroyed civilian infrastructure, cut off basic humanitarian supplies and by current reports resulted in more than 21,000 deaths. While the administration has publicly said it has concerns about Israel’s actions, suggesting it is being even more forthright behind closed doors, it has shielded or watered down important U.N. resolutions and not indicated a desire to condition or suspend military aid.

Given how Israel is conducting its assault on Gaza, it strains credulity to believe they are meeting the Biden administration’s “more likely than not” standard for not providing arms to partners who misuse them. A recent report in Israeli media that the U.S. has thus far not approved a request for Apache helicopters may indicate the Biden administration has limits to its support. While the administration has set a high standard for transparency in weapons provision to Ukraine, that is sorely lacking for Israel.

The initial days and weeks of 2024 — with ongoing decisions on support to Israel and Ukraine, and possible developments with Saudi Arabia — are critical ones for the Biden administration. They will be telling for assessing an administration that has put in place policies that should promote human rights and protection of civilians, but in practice has often failed to apply those policies.

Jeff Abramson is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy. He also directs the Forum on the Arms Trade.

Throughout the first half of the Cold War, ground-based air defenses, or GBAD, were postured to support NATO’s Forward Defense strategy for Central Europe. Nike and Hawk surface-to-air missiles were deployed in a two-layer belt in West Germany. By the 1970s, after several improvement programs, both systems were exhausting their modernization potential, whereas the Soviet threat was steadily rising.

Moreover, as NATO turned toward Flexible Response — emphasizing graduated, primarily conventional options over massive nuclear retaliation — there was a desire for a non-nuclear replacement of Nike. But this required greater speed, range and maneuverability of the interceptors, a leap in sensor and guidance technology, as well as improvements to command, control and communication systems. Patriot was to provide this capability upgrade to U.S. and allied ground-based air defenses.

With defense budgets strained by other modernization priorities, Bonn and Washington struck an elaborate cost-sharing agreement to equip West Germany’s Bundeswehr with 36 Patriot fire units, ultimately boasting a total of 288 missile launchers with upward of 2,300 interceptors. Twelve fire units would be purchased by Bonn outright, and another 12 would be supplied by Washington. Twelve more would be lent to West Germany by the United States for an initial period of 10 years; all would be operated by approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr soldiers.

Bonn and Washington also agreed to procure several dozen Roland fire units — a Franco-German mobile short-range surface-to-air missile system — to protect U.S. and West German airfields in the country. These, too, would be operated by Bundeswehr troops. The Cold War ended before all Patriot systems arrived in now-reunified Germany.

In the post-Cold War period, costly air defense assets were a welcome target for cuts to military budgets across Europe. The U.S.-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System development effort floundered; counter-UAV capabilities, too, received little attention. German Air Force officer Friederike Hartung’s recent study provides an excellent overview of the changing role of the Bundeswehr’s shrinking GBAD capability after 1990, barely able to keep running a dozen Patriot batteries and little else when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But gaps are even wider elsewhere in Europe.

Russia’s missile and drone attacks on military and civilian targets across Ukraine, and the shock of the war more broadly, produced a hurried response from European leaders to finally follow through on NATO plans to rebuild allied air defenses. By donating various systems, they helped Kyiv erect the densest air defense bubble on the continent. But this further strained European capabilities.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s European Sky Shield Initiative, or ESSI, attempts to aggregate demand and leverage economies of scale for off-the-shelf GBAD systems, principally Patriot and the German-produced IRIS-T SLM. While 18 of Germany’s European partners signed up for the initiative to date, some criticized the choice of systems included (the French-Italian SAMP/T is not on the list, for example). Paris voiced concerns about the strategic implications of Berlin’s decision to purchase Israel’s Arrow 3 to protect against exo-atmospheric threats, worrying that it signals distrust in deterrence and could undermine strategic stability. Warsaw, meanwhile, decided years ago to modernize all layers of the Polish GBAD infrastructure. It saw no benefit from join the German-led initiative.

There are several paths to further broaden and deepen European cooperation on GBAD. The new Polish government outlined in its agenda for the first 100 days to follow through on its predecessor’s plan to acquire six Patriot batteries and to now also join ESSI. Poland’s desired Integrated Battle Command System configuration for its new Patriot batteries was previously considered a technical barrier to such a move, but other Europeans’ early expressions of interest in the capability could pave the way, thus reducing the price tag for Warsaw and expanding the initiative with a key Eastern European ally.

The 1983 agreement’s mechanism for U.S.-owned GBAD fire units to be operated by West German soldiers could serve as a template to move ESSI from a buyers club to a more integrated European pillar in NATO’s air and missile defense architecture. Instead of deploying their own troops to the eastern front, some Western European allies might find it easier to procure the hardware and have it then be operated by Estonian, Polish or Romanian personnel. This would further incentivize standardization and move European GBAD from interoperable to interchangeable.

Early European investments to expand industrial capacity for air defense systems are already benefiting Ukraine as well. A significant part of the growing production of interceptors for IRIS-T, for example, goes to Ukraine. The establishment of a tactical Patriot Advanced Capability-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile production facility in Germany will also help to replenish its stocks. But to get more urgently needed launchers and fire units there, the 1983 agreement’s lending model could be attractive for Ukraine’s partners by lowering the immediate financial burden compared to donations.

Today, NATO’s border with Russia is double the length of the Cold War’s inner-German dividing line. To extend an effective missile shield over the entirety of NATO’s European territory — or even only of front-line allies — would be both technically infeasible and prohibitively expensive. European NATO allies must complement efforts to strengthen GBAD with investments in deep-strike capabilities. But to advance cooperation in these areas, they do not need to reinvent the wheel. Their archives hold plenty inspiration.

Rafael Loss is the coordinator for pan-European data projects at the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Berlin office. He is an expert in German and European foreign and security policy, European integration, trans-Atlantic relations, and nuclear policy.