The government appointed Judith Collins to the role in October. She’s also the attorney general; the minister for the Government Communications Security Bureau; the minister in charge of digitizing the government; the minister of the Security Intelligence Service; the minister of science, innovation and technology; and the minister of space.

The New Zealand Defence Force’s briefing to the new minister noted the country faces a “challenging strategic environment” not seen for decades, adding that climate change is “of increasing concern.”

While the briefing explained the military is energized by newly acquired equipment, it also cautioned personnel could feel overwhelmed, given they are charged with maintaining the existing inventory while adopting more materiel.

Furthermore, the force has been experiencing retention and recruitment issues. While deployments are “a key motivator for our people,” the diminishing number of qualified and experienced people called upon to deploy is problematic, the briefing noted. “Although recruitment of new personnel continues, unlike civilian staff, uniformed personnel cannot be recruited from the general labor market, as their skills take years to acquire and that training occurs inside the force.”

Defense News put these concerns and more to the minister in a Feb. 8 interview, which was edited for length and clarity.

The previous government released a defense policy and strategy document in August 2023. What do you think of it?

The defense strategy released last year reflected the changing strategic environment and the need to update New Zealand’s policy settings to a more proactive and deliberate approach to security and defense. That geopolitical tension has, if anything, increased since its release.

When will the next defense whitepaper arrive?

Work is underway on a Defence Capability Plan, which will signal the government’s future investment intentions for defense.

What are your priorities for defense and the three armed services?

Retention, interoperability, innovation and international partnerships are my priorities for defense. This includes giving our personnel more opportunities to do what they signed up for and looking at how we can do things differently.

We must take every opportunity to engage with our international partners so we can further our national interests and ensure the New Zealand perspective is heard. We must also listen so we can contribute meaningfully, and be open to new opportunities where they align with our interests.

To what do you attribute the shortage of recruits and the high attrition in the New Zealand Defence Force?

There are several drivers behind the high attrition rates at NZDF, including remuneration, a strong labor market and highly skilled defense personnel being in demand. The NZDF is working on a number of initiatives to address attrition issues. As of late December 2023, the overall regular force’s attrition rate — across all three services — was 11.9%, down from 15.6% 10 months earlier.

In mid-2023, Air Marshal Kevin Short, the chief of the NZDF, told Defense News that the war in Ukraine has emphasized the importance of the military’s supply chain. He said the force would “look at its ‘just in time’ approach, and adjust to a ‘just in case’ approach.” With the demand for ammunition soaring, has New Zealand had to wait longer than usual for ammo, particularly as the country modifies its acquisition approach?

The NZDF is experiencing longer ammunition and explosive procurement lead times than historically normal, but it is wrong to say it has moved from “just in time” to “just in case” ordering. The NZDF orders ammunition to meet stockholdings that support training and force generation, as well as to maintain stockholdings necessary to meet contingencies.

New Zealand is a nation of islands, yet the Navy is the least funded and staffed of the services. Why is that? Will this change?

The NZDF is funded and equipped based on the priorities of the government of the day and continues to serve at the direction of the government of the day, with the equipment and staffing it has available.

Work on future opportunities for the maritime fleet began last year, with market research being undertaken and 49 responses received. The next stage will be advice to the government on next steps for future investment intentions for defense, and I look forward to sharing more details at that stage.

The second pillar of AUKUS — the defense cooperation agreement between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. — could benefit New Zealand’s defense industry and military. Talk about that potential opportunity.

We are actively looking for ways in which New Zealand can participate in AUKUS’ second pillar, as discussed at the Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations 2+2 meeting in early February between the foreign affairs and defense ministers of both New Zealand and Australia.

Australian officials will visit New Zealand as soon as possible to discuss opportunities for New Zealand to join, and in what areas we can add value. I expect it will be in technology and space, which are both areas that offer opportunities to New Zealand businesses and scientists. We expect to take a formal decision on participation at some point this year as details emerge.

We do expect that the second pillar could create potential openings for collaboration with the New Zealand’s defense industry and adjacent technology companies. Collaboration between Australia’s and New Zealand’s defense industries is something we actively encourage, and we are always looking for ways to reduce barriers.

Will New Zealand establish a space command?

There are no current plans for a space command under New Zealand’s joint forces. The development of a Defence Capability Plan currently underway will consider investment options, including options for space, against the government’s priorities, policy settings and financial considerations.

What more might New Zealand do to support Ukraine as it fights off a Russian invasion?

New Zealand continues to stand with Ukraine in complete solidarity for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. New Zealand’s support to Ukraine’s self-defense since Russia’s invasion has included economic, diplomatic and military elements. As part of this ongoing support, NZDF deployments that provide support and training to Ukraine are continuing.

Several European military leaders have warned their citizens about a potential war with Russia. Do you envisage issuing a similar alert?

Comments made domestically by other countries are a matter for them, and I do not have a comment to make on these.

The office is the service’s hub for commercial engagement, overseeing a slew of initiatives, including SpaceWERX — the Space Force’s innovation arm — and Space Systems Command’s Front Door, an online portal companies can use to connect with the acquisition community. It’s also leading the establishment of a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, an effort to scale up its use of commercial capabilities during a conflict.

The Commercial Space Office’s creation came amid a push within the Space Force to strengthen its partnership with commercial industry. Officials have called for the acquisition workforce to consider opportunities to buy services and systems from industry — rather than build a bespoke government satellite — wherever possible.

Col. Richard Kniseley, who leads the office, recently sat down with C4ISRNET at the Space Mobility Conference in Orlando, Florida. He talked about the office’s accomplishments over the last year and its priorities for 2024.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What has your office done since its creation last year?

We marched forward with the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, and stood up that task force with many Department of Defense subject matter experts to really flesh out that framework. That all culminated in a successful briefing to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall around September where he said: “Go forth and prosper.” He considered this good news and a step in the right direction, especially as we’re looking at great power competition.

The SSC Front Door has been meeting with many different industry members every day. This past August, we onboarded a new website and share tool. Since then, we’ve met with over 200 industry members. The goal of that website was to have faster response time, to make sure that we were assessing industry, understanding their maturity levels, and then understanding the mission areas they can play in so that we can get them to the right mission area owner.

Our alignment with SpaceWERX has proved very successful. We aligned a SpaceWERX challenge with one of our first reverse industry days out of the gate, which was alternative positioning, navigation and timing. The goal of that was to seed industry, but also to keep a lot of the conversations going and mature capabilities.

We also awarded, out of the Commercial Satellite Communications Office, the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit contract, which was a $900 million [indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract]. It went out to 20 different vendors and covered many different mission areas. We didn’t want to hone in just on commercial SATCOM, so we opened it up to alternative position, navigation and timing, as well as space domain awareness, to name a few. The goal out of that was to capitalize on dual-use capabilities.

So we are not slowing down in 2024; it is going to be a very busy year, and we’ve already got a number of different things on the horizon.

How do you expect the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit contractor pool to grow? What value will that bring to the Space Force?

While it was awarded to 20 providers, we are onboarding new providers. In fact, we have an onboarding period right now, which ends in May, where new providers can reach out to the Commercial SATCOM Office and be evaluated as a provider on that contract.

It allows the contractors to propose areas where they can benefit the Department of Defense. It’s a very open contract, and it allows us to work and reach out with a lot of those providers. But that contract also allows us to combine a lot of different requirements across the Department of Defense into one award, so that we’re not doing one award, one award, one award. The first task order that got awarded to SpaceX combined requirements from over 70 different agencies.

So it’s the ability to get better pricing and economic order quantity by combining a lot of those requirements. It allows us to get more providers on, understand their capabilities, and get those commercial capabilities out to the warfighter and better integrated across the space enterprise.

The Space Mobility Conference saw a heavy focus on space servicing. What is your office doing in this area? How are you engaging with the companies developing these capabilities?

A great deal of the companies that have been coming through the Front Door that we have been meeting with have been companies aligning themselves with servicing, mobility and logistics. So whether we have companies that are looking at the refueling aspect of it, companies that are looking at the repair aspect of it or even the maneuverability aspect of it — there is a great deal of innovation and expertise in those different areas.

What we’ve been doing is assessing these companies for their maturity level, but also one of the functions of the Front Door is to take a look at the investments in those companies — venture capital and also any potential nefarious capital. We do want to be investing in companies that are on the up and up. But at the same time, we’re also looking at companies where the government can be one of many customers and not just be a crutch to lean on.

We’ve been bridging that gap between the companies and the mission areas. We’ve been introducing a lot of great companies to the Assured Access to Space team — so looking for investment opportunities there as well as working with the Space Systems Integration Office. They are looking at the overall enterprise and where does servicing, mobility and logistics fit into that overall architecture.

You can only imagine what those capabilities will do for the mission because you will be able to refuel some of our [high-value] space vehicles, which allows them to stay on orbit longer and do more mission passes.

Some of the technologies that are coming into play have a lot more size, weight and power so that while they can be carrying space vehicles to many different orbits, these things can also carry gas cans on them. They have more abilities to stay on orbit longer. You can even deploy them, and you don’t even need to use the space vehicles right away; they could just sit there in a loiter state, which kind of lends itself a little bit more to the logistics side of the house. You could save the gas on those space vehicles and have them ready, which also lends itself more to a tactically responsive space standpoint.

What are the most important parts of the Space Force’s upcoming commercial space strategy?

It’s going to do two things. One, it’s going to be a very clear message to the government that because of the threats, we need to change how we do things. Resting on building everything in house is just not palatable anymore. We need to integrate with commercial [sectors] at better scale. It recognizes how the commercial industry is innovating every single day. A lot of the expertise is out there.

What the strategy is also going to do is be a signal to industry of areas of importance to us. We’re not going to prioritize areas, but it will be very clear some of the areas that are very important to the government. Throughout the strategy, there will be kind of a mixture of strategy, but also some implementation. So there’ll be some actions that will be in that strategy, and then it will also be further fleshed out with implementation plans that will be released after the strategy is released.

The Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, or CASR, framework received approval last fall. How is your office implementing that?

My No. 1 focus is working with [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the National Space Council on a threat-sharing model. The Department of Defense has a few of them that we are exploring.

We are working to develop a surveillance plan for CASR membership. That’s really going to lend itself into the reliability construct, ensuring they stay in good standing as a member. Are they still investing in their cyber capabilities? Are they able to surge or adhere to the contract as planned? And even looking at some of their manufacturing capabilities. Once we get you to that membership, we need to make sure you’re ready for what that potential bad day might be.

We’re also integrating right now with tactically responsive space [team]. We want to inject CASR fundamentals and exercises into one of their next capability exercises. I could easily see a scenario of a surging of capability, or even potentially taking space vehicles off a production line for a CASR need. That’s really going to help us exercise the contract and the concept of operations.

We are starting to develop the concept of operations, partnered with U.S. Space Command, primarily looking at commercial satellite communications as the first one. Putting that to paper is going to help us work toward exercises as well. But then after that, it’s really working on securing funding.

When will you start putting companies on contract for CASR?

We’re going to start fleshing out the contract pieces a little bit more this year.

I promised this to industry: We will still have a couple more industry offerings so that I can be completely transparent with them before they start seeing this in contracts. I almost want to get a litmus test from them and make sure that I’m going down the right path, especially as we’re starting to develop our incentive plan.

I’m going to potentially have something this year, but probably 2025.

You previously said it’s important to have a sustained budget line, or program element, for commercial space capabilities, including CASR. Where does that effort stand?

I’m anxiously waiting on the appropriations bill. If all goes well, the appropriations bill could be the mechanism that starts the commercial space program element. There was some language in the Senate Appropriations Committee markup that pretty much allows for the creation of it, and I just want to see if that language makes its way through. Those dollars were specifically targeted at commercial surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking, so that would be a budget activity created under the commercial space piece. We’re waiting to see the outcome of that one.

What other efforts would receive funding under that new budget line?

We’re definitely looking at the funding of some enterprise capabilities, like funding for exercises, funding for threat sharing — all of that.

There will need to be an enduring CASR line in there to keep that overall enterprise together. Some of the biggest feedback we got from industry was that we need to understand what’s going on with the threat. And I totally resonated with that because that’s going to help them be more responsive to our needs. It’s going to help inform their business area. If they’re a CASR member, then that’ll help them indicate when a call-up might be OK.

Brig. Gen. Mike Zuhlsdorf is a key player in those discussions. He serves as the deputy director for resource integration under the Air Force’s logistics, engineering and force protection branch.

As other defense officials negotiate with foreign leaders for access to bare-bones airfields and more established bases overseas, it’s Zuhlsdorf’s team that is figuring out how to turn those sites into valuable Air Force lily pads in a maritime-dominant region for the decades ahead.

Zuhlsdorf spoke to Air Force Times at the Pentagon on Dec. 15. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Is the Air Force talking to other countries about using foreign bases that already exist, or are you considering building new sites?

We are not putting in new bases. These are bases and airfields that we’ve had since World War II, where we were able to hopscotch across the Pacific to ultimately get close enough to Japan. There are a lot of airfields like that, whether it’s in the first island chain — Japan down through the Philippines — or the second island chain, near Guam and Tinian.

We’re talking about renovating, rejuvenating and rehabilitating. We will make sure the pavement is still viable, trim back the vegetation where the jungle has encroached on the runway, and set up the basic essentials that we need in the event that we need to flush aircraft from a hub into these spokes, keep them safe and then turn them.

What do we need? Things like fuel; major aircraft parts that six to 12 airmen might be able to fix there; maybe some munitions [and airfield repair resources]; the essential lighting or navigational systems for nighttime operations. A little bit of base air defense might be part of that, or camouflage, concealment and deception. Almost all the hubs will have a command, control and communication system that will fly in with them so that we can maintain connectivity to the mothership at all times.

We are working with allies and partners. Pacific Air Forces has identified airfields that we want to invest in, and they’re going to work with the Philippines and Australia to do that. We are teaming with them on some projects that will allow us to get fuel out there, some munitions capability and other long-range transport aircraft that would come in and be able to resupply.

Read all Military Times coverage of China

Which existing airfields are currently on the list?

There are more in the second island chain that we are identifying. There are additional airfields that are in Guam and a few in the first island chain that we’ll eventually get to.

What we’re trying to do is nail down access and overflight stuff before a formal announcement would come out. Those that have been in the press are the ones where we’ve already teamed with those countries. We are working with other allies and partners in the area to secure that very critical access, overflight and basing.

[Editor’s note: A spokesperson for the Air Force’s international affairs branch declined to provide specifics about which countries the U.S. is in talks with to host air operations abroad.]

Will the Air Force expand Andersen Air Force Base on Guam or other areas on the island?

We have projects for some hangars that are going in at Andersen, and at some of the chosen hubs we want to operate out of, maybe a spoke or two — wherever we decide is optimal. We’re looking to maybe throw up a shelter system that allows us to safeguard critical equipment. We need to take into account the sustainment of all that equipment we pre-position, and so we will want to put those into a controlled-environment facility so that when we need it, it’ll operate as advertised.

We’re also thinking about protecting those hubs and spokes so that the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines and guardians that we’re going to send out there will be as safe as possible. There’s a big threat from ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. We’re trying to make sure those airmen can turn those aircraft as advertised.

None of us who wear this uniform are looking for war. Our job is to be prudent with taxpayer dollars, and what the American people want from us is to plan.

What’s the timeline to open these sites? How are you phasing them in?

Two to three future years defense programs (FYDP). We are working through [which sites should be prioritized].

Is 10-15 years too long?

We’re going to see concrete stuff within a [five-year] FYDP and it will continue to manifest through that time period. We’ve got some weapon systems in the queue — Next Generation Air Dominance, collaborative combat aircraft. It’ll happen in that window.

What are you learning from Air Force spokes across Europe that you’ve used in partner countries since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? How are you applying those lessons to the Pacific?

This is a unique opportunity for us. We’ve been in U.S. Central Command, and being able to move pieces, parts, munitions, aircraft, personnel and everything like that has been relatively uncontested. Yes, the Army has had some challenges there when you talk about the main supply routes, but generally it was not a contested environment. Ukraine is a contested environment, and logistics lessons that we learn are invaluable.

What are the critical pieces and parts that they need? How did they get these parts from location X to location Y? Did they use this system or that system? How did they pull the data? We are rapidly getting to a data analytics framework that’s going to allow us to visibly see what supplies and equipment we need. We’re going to be able to throw that up into a basing and logistics data analytics environment that’s going to allow us to, as logisticians, figure out where we need to put the next aircraft part or the next load of fuel.

Russia and Ukraine have a lot of small unmanned aerial systems that are impeding each other’s progress. How are they tracking those systems? How are they taking those systems down? How are they doing air defense for air bases? Those lessons are being gathered up.

What is the proposed cost for Pacific basing projects in fiscal 2025?

We’re working through FY25. That’s part of the resourcing our senior leaders are churning through right now.

There hasn’t been a profound change in counter-drone technology over the past several years. Where does that capability stand and what would you like to see?

We are probably still nascent. We literally just had conversations about this — within the last four or five months — about expanding and investing more in that very important battlespace. There’s a lot of research and a lot of dollars that are being applied to that problem set. You see that coming into play not only in the Ukrainian-Russian war, but also now with Hamas and Israel.

Are small drones a threat in the Pacific, despite the region’s significant size?

These are all islands, and they all have an indigenous population. You can rest assured that there’s probably people who don’t like the United States on those islands. Some of these smaller systems could absolutely impact an air tasking order. To protect the integrity of that air tasking order, we need to think through how we can get at that small threat, while other people are thinking through those ballistic missiles and those hypersonic missiles.

It is a full-spectrum air defense platform for an air base that we’re looking at, along with the camouflage, concealment and deception program, electronic warfare, and all these bits and pieces.

What are the main hurdles to achieving this vision?

One of the big problems is not having a budget. When you think about procurement lines that we need to stand up and invest in, we absolutely need Congress’ help in getting a budget passed so we can get the capabilities that we know we need.

There’s always the joint interoperability piece that we are yearning for, and the ability to share information with our allies and partners. We’re trying to work a little bit more aggressively on what information we can share with them, and what tactics, techniques and procedures we might be able to share. We’ve had success in Australia recently on some refueling efforts with the F-35 fighter jet. That’s a big success.

We’re breaking down barriers where we can to make sure that we’ve got the necessary capability and that everybody understands what that is. We’re sending people over to Japan right now to work with them even closer on exercises and on different weapons systems. Those are big barriers, but we’re overcoming them.

The threat that’s been posed to us over the last three or four years from the People’s Republic of China has galvanized a lot of allies and partners of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. There’s an impetus for us to work even closer together moving forward.

What near-term spending is on the horizon?

We’re investing in pre-positioned assets. That includes the kits with the tools and equipment that are necessary to do the maintenance on those aircraft. We’re investing in fuel bladders, in the renovation of the airfields, and in the airfield damage and repair equipment.

Think about heavy equipment — mobile aircraft arresting systems. Some of that stuff we have not put on a production line in a long time. We are investing in production lines to get that built and put in place within this Future Years Defense Program. We’re investing in communication equipment that will allow us to do command and control.

We’re investing in our airmen with multi-capable airman training. The Air Force Expeditionary Center at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, is putting together the curriculum that’s necessary for us to train our airmen and get them ready to have a civil engineer do not just civil engineering work, but maybe change a tire or load a bomb or refuel a jet or protect the base. It’s about investing in all those things that are necessary for us to get at a threat that, frankly, we just haven’t had to think about as much in the last 30 years.

When I came in, it was the Soviet Union, it was protecting the Fulda Gap in Germany. We learned a lot of skills that were multi-capable back in the late 1980s that we are now dusting off. We’re going to apply that to this near-peer fight.

But it has been difficult for the service to operate all of its maritime platforms amid recruiting and retention woes. In January 2023, a third of the Navy’s ships were docked due to a shortage of sailors, causing a loss of “significant flexibility,” the service’s top officer, Rear Adm. David Proctor, told Defense News at the time.

On Nov. 15, the Defense Ministry closed a request for information about replacing nearly the entire naval fleet. The Navy’s flagship — its 568-foot replenishment vessel HMNZS Aotearoa — has been in service for three years, but the remaining eight ships — two frigates, two inshore and two offshore patrol vessels, a sealift ship, and a dive and hydrographic ship — will reach the end of their service lives in the mid-2030s.

Defense News recently checked in with Proctor to discuss the state of the Navy, what’s planned for 2024 and ongoing efforts to strengthen the service. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What responses have you received to the request for information for new ships?

A wide range of responses. Respondents included shipbuilders, system suppliers and maritime service providers, and the quality of information is an encouraging indication of interest in New Zealand’s defense. The responses are providing industry input to maritime fleet options in support of the Defence Capability Plan.

[Editor’s note: A New Zealand Defence Force spokesperson told Defense News after this interview the government received 49 responses to the RFI, but declined to provide further details.]

What’s next?

The development of the Defence Capability Plan is a process that explores a range of investment options to balance capability and resources. These options are assessed against extant defense policy. No decisions on specific ship types have been made at this point. The DCP will present investment options for government to consider.

Talk about the state of the Royal New Zealand Navy over the last year.

We have experienced a challenging year, with a declining workforce in 2023. Attrition is currently outstripping recruiting. But key measures and recruiting initiatives are underway to address this issue. The attrition rate is decreasing, indicating these initiatives are having a positive effect on addressing workforce issues.

How do you balance training against the deployment of forces?

The Royal New Zealand Navy is currently regenerating, following widely reported attrition and recruiting issues since the COVID-19 pandemic. This process is not without challenges as a result of the hollowness of the Navy.

In particular, the cohort where we are most short is needed to both keep the fleet at sea and to deliver specialist training ashore. This requires careful management and some compromise to maximize our ability to have ships at sea on operational deployments and/or providing at-sea training, while still being able to deliver world-class training ashore and transition to a sustainable training state.

What’s planned for the Navy in 2024?

The priorities for 2024 are to regenerate maritime capabilities in accordance with the Navy’s four-year regeneration plan, [which includes work on an integrated system to sustainably generate naval forces; a fresh focus on personnel capability to develop high-performing individuals and units; and a regeneration of combat capabilities]; continue the introduction and transition to new and upgraded capabilities; and improve maritime cooperation among Southwest Pacific partners by continuing to develop the effectiveness of the forum with Southwest Pacific heads of maritime forces.

As a small trading nation, New Zealand’s security is absolutely dependent on multinational organizations — like the World Trade Organization and the United Nations — and the rules-based international system to advance its interests. Specifically for the Royal New Zealand Navy, a number of key challenges and opportunities exist which, if achieved, would enable the service to improve its operational ability.

It is crucial that the Navy is able to continue reducing the current attrition rate and increase recruiting in order to regenerate the service and ensure the effective delivery of outputs.

As we continue to deliver our mission, which is to advance New Zealand’s interests from the sea as well as progress our strategic initiatives, we must also maintain our personnel and operational competencies as we transition to new capabilities. In addition, we must ensure that we put in place mechanisms that allow us to unlock the full potential and benefits from any new capabilities we are introducing. This will allow us to fully use the enhanced military platforms and technologies the government is investing in.

Gaining the right balance between effectiveness and efficiency is required to successfully introduce the future Navy while minimizing cost to New Zealanders. This will be done by ensuring we do the right things the right way so we can optimize effort and prioritize resources — for example, personnel, maintenance, finances, and ships and shore infrastructure.

Greater focus on capacity building within our region and the development of a body of knowledge on maritime security and strategic matters will continue to enhance the Navy’s position as subject matter experts in the maritime security domain. Increased engagement with partner navies, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutes and other government agencies will enhance the Navy’s ability to make a difference and will promote a wider understanding of the value of the service.

Of course, it’s worth noting the volatile security environment as well as the need to be ready to provide the government with options covering the full spectrum of maritime military operations, including combat and lethal force in defense of New Zealand, our allies and our interests.

How is recruiting going?

The Royal New Zealand Navy acknowledges that a naval candidate in 2024 is vastly different to one who would have joined in 2004. Access to technology and a reliance on fast responses can mean candidates may expect those same timelines from their recruiter. However, standardized assessment processes are required for us to accurately evaluate candidates and make sure we abide by our security, medical and academic standards.

This has involved robust action plans to enhance the recruiting approach, such as the development and publishing of operating processes, technical upgrades to operating systems, updates to minimum entry requirements, and the ongoing development of recruiters’ skills.

How are you balancing the varying levels of experience between new and seasoned sailors?

After a period of heightened attrition, the average level of experience across the Navy has fallen. Significant overseas ship deployments in both 2022 and 2023 have helped begin to rebuild these, as will deployments planned for 2024 and 2025.

A small but significant number of highly experienced subject matter experts have been used to provide guidance in their areas to those at sea and at the beginning of their careers.

What could the service gain from the trilateral AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States?

It remains to be seen what opportunities might exist for New Zealand under the second pillar of AUKUS, [which involves cooperative efforts to develop and field undersea capabilities, among other advanced technologies].

Decisions on this matter will be for ministers.

How has New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy affected the Navy?

The impact has been in relation to our Navy’s engagement with the U.S. Navy. But the relationship has largely moved beyond past differences over nuclear policy that impacted ship visits for a period of time. The Wellington Declaration of 2010 and the Washington Declaration of 2012 have enabled a notable reengagement between the two navies.

How do you view China’s maritime growth?

China continues to modernize its military. New Zealand is fully invested in collective security approaches alongside our key partners and in supporting the international rules-based system.

What is the Navy doing with uncrewed platforms at sea?

The Navy and Defence Force currently use a number of small uncrewed systems for a variety of tasks, and are undertaking experimentation to investigate their potential for greater use in a broader range of roles. In support of the Defence Capability Plan, the fleet is considering uncrewed capability as part of a solution set for the future Navy.

[Editor’s note: The military spokesperson also told Defense News the Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessel is set to undergo an initial confirmation of standard operating procedures, which would allow the Navy to build confidence and experience with the system as well as launch trials to support other government agencies, while gradually increasing range and duration of use around the country’s waters. The level of endurance the platform offers at sea, alongside its onboard cameras and radar, could benefit maritime patrol missions. The spokesperson noted Bluebottle is a quiet platform able to carry a towed array sonar.]

[The Navy leased the Martac-made Mantas T12 uncrewed surface vessel for three months in mid-2022. The spokesperson told Defense News the service used the platform to better understand such technology. Martac’s chief marketing officer, Stephen Ferretti, told Defense News in 2022 the T12′s sensors include electro-optical/infrared cameras for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well as multibeam, single-beam, side-scan and other sonar types for object detection and hydrographic surveying missions.]

A pivot away from the Greater Middle East, where it sunk decades of effort and manpower, to confront the wider ambitions of Russia and China is forcing the department to reevaluate how it collects its battlefield intelligence and the means through which it is shared. Long-range weapons, sensitive radars and powerful jammers mean the U.S. military must glean details from farther away while further insulating digital systems.

Bombardier Defense has taken note, according to Vice President Steve Patrick, and is investing internally to meet the changing demands. The company is among the winners of two recent U.S. Army intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance contracts, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and has been working overseas with Saab on early warning aircraft.

In an interview with C4ISRNET, Patrick said flexibility is key to satisfying the needs of modern militaries, as hurdles in Europe differ from those in the Indo-Pacific.

Portions of the conversation below were edited for length and clarity.

The U.S. Army has made clear it needs to see farther into enemy territory, strike harder from that greater distance and be more precise — all at the same time. They’ve dubbed part of the equation deep sensing. Where do you see that concept now and in the future, and how is Bombardier contributing?

I think deep sensing is part of the Army’s vision for the Multi-Domain Sensing System, the MDSS, as they call it. Really, it’s all about being able to see, as you say, farther into enemy territory, and the territory itself is farther away from the homeland.

There’s a real need for capability that allows you to not only see farther, but see farther from farther. So where Bombardier Defense can help in that equation is to bring our platforms to bear. Those platforms are designed to be high-altitude, long-endurance assets that can persist in and around the battlespace and give that ability to look further into enemy territory.

How does it play into this top priority of long-range fires that the Army has?

When you think of long-range fires, the additional word is precision. Precision implies that you need a target. If you’re going to have a target, you need to be able to surveil the area and to identify a target of interest.

Where the Bombardier platform plays is we provide that asset that hosts a radar, or some other sensor, that can identify the target and then pass it back to the command-and-control functions.

What is ‘deep sensing’ and why is the US Army so focused on it?

What makes this converted business jet a good candidate for serious military operations? What would you say to skeptics that believe maybe another option, or something more military hardened, is the better approach?

What we would say is that the attributes that the military needs from a platform are actually quite consistent with the attributes that some of our business-jet customers look for.

First of all, its reliability. The business customer expects the aircraft to perform when they need it, as does the military customer. The mission is critical. So reliability is important, as his performance. A lot of our aircraft have exceptional endurance, high altitude, high speed. They can operate from short runways. That performance gives flexibility to the military customers.

There’s also the fact that they are modern, in-production assets. Our aircraft are in production today. They are going to be in production for many years. So we deal with things like obsolescence and the latest technology in our course of business.

And then, perhaps, the biggest thing that brings the business jet into the equation is the advancement of technology. Twenty years ago, sensor payloads, radars, electronic equipment would fill a room the size of this. Now, that’s shrunk down to the size of maybe an iPhone — so a much smaller footprint to accommodate the same sensors. That makes a business jet very appealing in that market.

Bombardier is participating in the Army’s recently awarded ATHENA-R and -S contracts and the Air Force’s BACN. Why your aircraft? And what are some examples of the payloads?

Why our aircraft? It’s for the reasons I just indicated. It’s all about reliability, performance and availability of the airframe itself.

When we think of each of those missions, the BACN program with the Air Force, it’s really a communications node. Some call it flying Wi-Fi in the sky, linking together all the different waveforms from different users so that everyone can communicate on the same network over vast areas of terrain, whether it’s airborne, maritime or ground assets.

The Army programs, on the other hand, the ATHENA programs, those are really starting to look into intelligence gathering rather than communication, bringing onboard signals intelligence packages, radars, to provide the commanders on the ground with an overview of the battlespace.

L3Harris says Viper Shield electronic warfare tool for F-16s nears goal

Where is Bombardier Defense investing internally? What is the company interested in achieving in the near- or medium-term?

Bombardier Defense has been a part of Bombardier Aerospace for many, many years. What we’re now seeing, though, is an increased demand for our products and services. So we’re starting to build up our capability, predominantly in Wichita, Kansas, as the center of activity for engineering and modification.

What we’re bringing forward, what we’re investing in, is reusable solutions.

We find that many customers want additional electrical power, they want cooling capabilities, they want payload volumes. So we’re creating and investing in those kinds of capabilities, as well as our power plants, to make the aircraft almost a Swiss Army knife, ready to be used for multiple missions at very short notice. Highly reusable. Low cost. Rapid to deploy.

Bombardier recently delivered the seventh Global aircraft to Saab to be made into the early warning GlobalEye. How would you describe that international relationship, like you have around the U.S, and what are you hoping to achieve with that program?

One of the things that Bombardier Defense prides itself on is our collaboration with prime integrators. Whether it’s L3Harris Technologies, Sierra Nevada, Raytheon in the states, or Saab overseas, we have a very strong collaborative relationship.

The GlobalEye is a great example of how we work well with another prime mission-system integrator. Our platform, their system coming together to bring a great capability to the market.

The GlobalEye is an airborne early warning aircraft, fundamentally, but also with additional surveillance capabilities. In fact, Saab calls it the Swing Role Surveillance System. The aircraft has been very successful with its launch customer in the United Arab Emirates. We also have an additional customer in Sweden. Together with Saab, we see lots of opportunities around the world for this product, in markets in Asia and Europe, and then the Far East.

Do you foresee growth or additional opportunities for this contractor-owned, contractor-operated arrangement in the defense world?

I think the one thing we all see is a growing demand for intelligence. And how you satisfy that demand can be either through service-owned and -operated assets, or contractor-owned, contractor-operated assets in the COCO model.

We’re here to support both models, whether it be a direct sale to the government or to one of these third-party companies, our aircraft to their payload gives the capability very quickly.

How do you see aerial surveillance or electronic warfare needs changing depending on the theater? The Pentagon is currently trying to balance Russia and China, the Greater Middle East and Africa, et cetera.

The Pentagon has been quite clear with the idea of great power competition and the need to engage with China at distance. That requires a certain type of asset to be able to perform the mission at a long range.

The recent activity with Russia in Ukraine has, sort of, pivoted back towards Europe. It’s a different theater compared to the Far East. Perhaps what that underscores, most of all, is we don’t know exactly what the future theater will be. So you need to be flexible.

The way that we view the problem set is not to have a single solution for a single problem, but have a solution that can satisfy multiple problems, that is redeployable across the globe very quickly, that can be pivoted to where the current crisis is.

The Bombardier solutions, we think, fit that niche very well.

There’s hardly a better image of the demands faced by her staff. As deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, Plumb is responsible for helping solve some of the Defense Department’s most vexing problems, from increasing industrial capacity to reforming the arcane Foreign Military Sales process.

Those tasks also involve supporting U.S. allies and partners — notably Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel.

The job has stretched the U.S. military’s stockpiles and challenged its ability to refill them; the White House has requested a $106 billion supplemental to address these problems.

Plumb spoke with Defense News on Nov. 7 about that funding request, U.S. security assistance and the Pentagon’s relationship with Capitol Hill. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What is your focus as we enter a new year?

We’re focused on three big areas. The first is our industrial base. The conflict in Ukraine revealed fragility in that industrial base. Where we’re focused is really demonstrating that it has responded shockingly well.

Take 155mm artillery rounds as an example: We doubled production in the last 12 months. We’re looking to get to the point where we produce 80,000-100,000 by the end of 2025. And we’re doing that on lots of systems — Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, Patriots, Javelins.

The second big area is production diplomacy. We’ve made use of our allies and partners through a range of activities over the last several years, and it’s clear there’s a lot we can do with them. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante has focused on his role as the national armament director with both the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and NATO, but also more broadly on co-development, co-production and co-sustainment. We have a partnership with Japan on the glide phase interceptor [for hypersonic defense], looking at co-development and the pre-deployment phase. In co-production, we’re working with Australia on the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. And on co-sustainment, we’re also working with Australia on a range of capacities and building on some of the work for AUKUS [the trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States]. That lets us have a different version of industrial base expansion.

The third big area is a consistent demand signal to industry. A lot of folks would think: “You have a large base budget, you buy lots of stuff in the department — that should be a signal to industry.” But what industry actually pays attention to is contracts. The faster we get things on contracts and the more predictable the funding can be, the better off we are.

We’re also working with Congress on a bunch of things that let us provide a longer-term, more consistent signal — multiyear procurements, economic order quantities, advanced procurements and a bunch of industrial base capacity expansion. At the end of the day, that’s what we’re looking to measure — surge capacity, but also resilience to unexpected events in the outside world.

“Consistent” and “predictable” do not come to mind when thinking about the appropriations process this year. To what extent does that process affect your ability to send a consistent demand signal?

It’s not good. Many of us who have been doing this for a while are used to having these continuing resolutions. We’re seeing increased delays and higher levels of churn. The problem with continuing resolutions is we can’t do new contracts, at the very least. That means subcontracts to suppliers can’t happen. Ultimately it means you can’t hire a workforce. That means if you have supply chains where there are cross-dependencies, you’re growing exponentially in delays rather than linearly.

For example, for 2024 we have some counter-unmanned aerial system investments planned, with a planned delivery in the 2024-2025 time frame. Let’s say we delay the continuing resolution; we get a 90-day delay. That 90 days means once the appropriation is received, we need to notify Congress. That’ll add another month. You’re now 120 days in. Then you’ve got to finish negotiating the contract, award the contract and then start making the advanced procurements. That’s four to eight more weeks. Then you add onto that the subcontract, so that’s another two to four weeks. That assumes that the delays, which maybe the prime contractors can absorb, don’t hit subcontractors particularly hard because they need the cash flow. We’re looking at 90- to 200-day delays in key systems that we know we need for the safety and security of warfighters — [all of which happened] because we just can’t get to a deal on appropriation.

The president’s supplemental request includes $50 billion for the defense-industrial base. What would that mean for the U.S. economy and the rate of production?

The first thing it looks like is a strong signal to the industrial base that we are going to continue to invest in these capabilities to buy back both U.S. readiness as well as support allies and partners. That continued drumbeat of investment allows industry to put its own skin in the game in terms of capital investments. The signal value is incredibly powerful, especially right now, to feel like this is not caught up in D.C. turmoil.

The second piece of it is the dollar flow. That means that industry literally starts building factory lines, moving in machines and hiring for its workforce; that has community benefits. We’re starting to look at where those dollars are flowing geographically because there is an economic infusion happening in many states across the country, particularly across the Midwest and the South. That has a meaningful economic impact right now in those local communities.

The place America is in manufacturing didn’t happen overnight, and we’re not going to get out of it overnight. Part of getting us into a resilient and robust manufacturing state of play involves making sure we can build those communities and those local investments so that you have the workforce, you have the people and you have the capital infrastructure.

The Defense Department has said supporting Taiwan and Ukraine is not a zero-sum game. But with Israel now at war, how has the situation changed?

Can we do all of these conflicts simultaneously? Absolutely. There’s some overlap in systems or some underlap in systems, and the two things that revealed are, one, that we really do need this manufacturing investment. I don’t want to sugarcoat the fact that there is fragility there.

The other piece is that in all of these conflicts, there is this high-tech/low-tech combination. Take Ukraine as an example: You’ve got trenches being dug out with mortars. You’ve also got a complex electronic warfare environment. In Israel, there is a range of tactics that look very familiar to folks who lived through all of the counterterrorism operations in the past, with a lot more targeting and specialized techniques. That’s a reminder for us in the department that our strategy is to increase production, but it also has to be about encouraging advanced techniques.

Talk about the upcoming National Defense Industrial Strategy and what it might contain.

What the strategy is intended to do is connect high-level policies to specific actions that the department is going to take, and then [help determine] how we want to measure progress.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin tasked a tiger team to make recommendations for improving the Foreign Military Sales process. What has come of that?

On the acquisition and sustainment side, we have two big areas we’ve been working on. One looks at procurement award lead time, where we’re looking to set baseline metrics and then track contracting cycle timelines more closely to try to improve responsiveness. We’ve collected the data and we’re setting the baselines. The goal in the next 12 months is to [determine whether the procurement lead time impacts FMS or is not a real cause of delay].

The second big area is aggregate demand work. What has been happening to date prior to the FMS tiger team is we sent our demand signal to industry. Other countries have their demand signal that pre-negotiates with industry, and the industry aggregates it all up. But everyone has a piece of information, and no one has the total information. We’re working with our partners in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and our prime industry partners to basically create an aggregate demand picture in a set of priority munition areas that are relatively high-demand areas.

[That group] is identifying the high-demand areas, some of which are related to air defense and key munitions, and then figuring out the process to get that aggregate demand — the key being you don’t want to wait all the way until you have a formal letter exchange, but you don’t want to do it too early and skew the demand process.

We’re entering a year when U.S. military stockpiles will probably experience extreme demands. What is the state of those stockpiles?

Thinking about the stockpile is thinking about it from the supply side, but the way I’d rather think about it is on the demand side. We know that our partners have demands for certain kinds of capabilities. A lot of the work our acquisition and sustainment team does with our partners in policy and with the combatant commands is [about fulfilling a materiel need] by looking across the range of systems we have in our stockpiles, and what is hot on production lines, and where can we rapidly increase production and reprioritize deliveries to meet the aggregate demand.

Stockpiles are a thing we manage strategically to maintain readiness. You’ve heard everyone from the president on down to Dr. LaPlante say we’re going to prioritize the readiness of our forces. But we have a lot of tools at our disposal to meet different demands.